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Internalizing Gender:  
International Goals and Comparative Realities  
Darren Rosenblum 
 
ABSTRACT: 
 
This Article uses the example of international women’s political rights to 
examine the value of comparative methodologies in analyzing the process by 
which nations internalize international norms.  CEDAW, the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the principal 
international convention on gender equality, models the complexities and the 
potential interaction between the disciplines of comparative and international 
scholarship.  International theory is divided between predominant theories of 
internalization and neorealist challenges to those theories.  In internalization 
theory, international law crashes into comparative law realities.  Comparative 
methodologies can add crucial complexity to internalization, the success of which 
depends on acknowledging vast differences in national legal cultures. 
Incorporation of difference may lead to wider acceptance of and agreement on 
norms and the remedies for violations of those norms. 
 
Brazilian and French internalization of CEDAW’s political representation 
norms have led those countries to require, respectively, thirty and fifty percent of 
all candidacies be reserved for women.  These contexts provide the opportunity to 
study internalization in divergent contexts.  Not only do laws vary among states, 
but that the very construction of gender itself varies. Comparative awareness of 
the cultural contingency of gender may lead to more direct and effective 
agreements that model change for real legal systems both international and 
national.  Understanding these differences point to crucial limitations in realist 
theories of international human rights law.   International law does affect state 
behavior, but states internalize international law in their own syncretic fashion.  
Recognizing cultural divergence in gender constructions, this Article concludes 
by advocating a more polyglot understanding of internalization, in which the 
pursuit of international goals draws on the recognition of divergent legal cultural 
realities.  
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Many husbands of women politicians in Brazil have one driving concern: 
“até pelo horário em que ela chega?”1 The prestige of political office does not 
relieve a woman from cooking dinner.  This attitude echoes the construction of 
gender in Brazil that burdens women with substantial “private” responsibilities, 
preventing their playing a “public” role.2 Socio-economic and legal structures in 
Brazil, such as the illegality of abortion and the unavailability of many social 
services cage women into this “private” role, with the clear effect of widespread 
electoral gender inequality.  The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (“CEDAW”) has served as the principal tool of 
international women’s rights, and Article Seven requires measures to promote 
political equality.   At the Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing in 
1995, activists looked to quotas as the key remedy for electoral gender inequality.  
In 1997, Brazil enacted a phased-in thirty percent quota on candidacies for public 
office.3
International women’s rights advocates have tried to attain the loftiest of 
goals – fair treatment across the planet for just over half the world’s population.4
In A Streetcar Named Desire, a doctor visits Blanche Dubois to commit her to an 
asylum.  In her lunacy, she tells the gentleman “Whoever you are, I have always 
depended on the kindness of strangers.”  Like Blanche, CEDAW depends on “the 
kindness of strangers.”5 Nation states are these strangers.  Their governments, 
mostly run by men, implement CEDAW’s measures with motivations and 
methods that may lead to unintended, and perhaps undesirable, results.  To escape 
this dependence on strangers’ kindness, advocates seek to increase women’s 
presence in government.  Although women constitute half the population,6 their 
representation in politics has been limited in most of the democratic world.  
 
1 The quote translates to: at what time will she get home?  Marta Suplicy, Coisa Pequena, FOLHA 
DE SÃO PAULO, Sept. 30, 1996, quoted in SONIA MALHEIROS MIGUEL, POLITICA DE COTAS POE 
SEXO 175 (2000) (hereinafter Malheiros Miguel). 
2 Other press commentary, notably a brief article in O Globo entitled “Parties are Male Ghettos,” 
confirms this widespread perception of a conflict between public life and family life. Partidos São 
Guetos Masculinos, O GLOBO, Oct. 6, 2002.  Feminist theory has long explored the use of the 
public/private dichotomy as a gendered construct. 
3 Malheiros Miguel, supra  note 1.  
4 “Women’s political rights” refers necessarily to a more essentialist construction of gender.  The 
preferred term in this paper is “electoral gender inequality,” which still references a liberal concept 
of equality, but suggests more of the broader factors that lead to the exclusion of women from 
political power structures. 
5 Tennessee Williams, A Streetcar Named Desire (1947)
6According to the 2000 Census, the population there are  86,223,155 women, and only 83,576,015 
men in Brazil.  “Censo 2000,” available at 
http://www.ibge.gov.br/censo/divulgacao_impresso.shtm (last visited on Aug. 15, 2006). 
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Political systems with greater gender balance would realize the goals of Article 
Seven of CEDAW.  
Yet those goals, like all international human rights law, can only gain 
force if states internalize international norms.  This process of internalization is 
one of the more heated debates in international law.  Liberals, cosmopolitans and 
others have argued for a broader and deeper international order.  Realists seek to 
undermine these claims, emphasizing states’ rational self-interest as the 
dispositive factor in international relations.7
International law does have its limits, but they do not arise from liberal 
universalism or even rational-actor theory.  Rather, they draw on broad 
differences among states.  International theory overlooks the domestic contexts 
into which international legal norms may be imported.  Notwithstanding the 
ubiquity of globalization, national contexts still matter.  Comparative law 
scholarship can inform understandings of the process of internalization of 
international norms.  Understanding internalization therefore demands the use of 
comparative methodologies, methodologies long ignored by international law 
scholars.  To inspire internalization, international law must engage the myriad 
legal, social and cultural differences among states.  Armed with such knowledge, 
international law can properly theorize and implement the process of 
internalization. 
The example of international women’s political rights serves as a case 
study for the value of comparative methodologies.  Part One will describe 
CEDAW, the principal international convention on gender equality, and 
international remedies reducing electoral gender inequality.  CEDAW raises the 
issue of the relationship between hard and soft law.8 CEDAW arouses concern 
that the softness of the remedies attached is a function of its subject – gender.  
Without substantial revision, CEDAW suffers from the double curse of 
international law: nonbinding and defective.9 CEDAW models both these 
complexities and the potential interaction between the disciplines of comparative 
and international scholarship.  How these international law remedies succeed and 
fail to achieve enforcement constitutes a puzzle in which international and 
comparative law interact in complicated, challenging, and revealing ways.  
 
7 See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH AND ERIC POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005). 
8 “Soft law” may be defined generally as law that either does not bind states or does not achieve its 
goals.  See Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 
581 (2005). 
9 The reference to nonbinding and defective is a measure adapted from Kal Raustiala’s 
discussion of soft law.  Raustiala, supra note 6.  Although CEDAW does actually bind 
signatories, the recommendations of the CEDAW Commission do not.  See, Catherine Powell, 
Lifting Our Veil of Ignorance: Culture, Constitutionalism, and Women’s Human Rights in Post-
September 11 America, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 331, 367, n.112 (2005). 
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Part Two interlaces theories of the internalization of international law with 
comparative law methodology.  First, this Part explores the conflict between 
predominant theories of internalization and the neorealist challenges to those 
theories.  Both sides of this debate overlook local factors that predominate over 
worldwide, universal responses.  Here, in internalization theory, international law 
crashes into comparative law realities.  Autarky defines the relationship between 
international and comparative law.  Yet the increasing fluidity of all kinds of 
borders suggests that these two areas of legal scholarship, both of which that 
examine the world beyond the United States, should engage each other 
substantively.   
This Part then argues that despite comparative law’s many discordant 
schools, it may contribute understanding internalization through the fundamental 
technique of understanding difference.  Comparative methodologies can add 
crucial complexity to internalization, the success of which depends on 
acknowledging vast differences in national legal cultures. It can reinvigorate 
internalization by permitting a reconsideration of long-held universal 
assumptions.  Incorporation of difference may lead to wider acceptance of and 
agreement on norms and the remedies for violations of those norms. 
 Part Three explores comparative internalization, returning to the puzzle 
posited by CEDAW, focusing on quotas used to remedy political inequality in 
France and Brazil.  Here, we can examine internalization in divergent domestic 
contexts.  Extremely disparate gender constructions across cultural and social 
hierarchies of economics, education and sexuality challenge understandings of 
internalization theory.10 This comparative study exposes not only legal cultural 
differences but provides insight into the process of integrating difference itself.  
Comparative methods reveal how gender constructions vary so dramatically 
among countries, subverting traditional understandings of the internalization 
process and creating opportunities for more effective internalization.  These 
contexts reveal that the very construction of gender varies among countries.  
Comparative awareness of the cultural contingency of gender may lead to more 
direct and effective agreements that model change for real legal systems both 
international and national. 
 Part Four applies the lessons of comparative internalization to realist and 
other international theories, emphasizing the impact of the culturally constructed 
nature of gender.  The contextual nature of internalization of international gender 
 
10 The difference of “exotic other females” intended as beneficiaries of international law, actually 
calls the viability of the entire project into question, as cross-cultural disputes, such as that over 
female genital cutting divide international activists.  Karen Engle, Female Subjects of Public 
International Law: Human Rights and the Exotic Other Female, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1509 
(1992). 
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norms points toward the substantial contribution that comparative scholarship 
may make.  This Article, recognizing cultural divergence in gender constructions, 
will conclude by advocating a more polyglot understanding of internalization, in 
which the pursuit of international goals draws on the recognition of divergent 
legal cultural realities.  
 
I. CEDAW, Quotas and Soft Law 
 
This Part will introduce the subject of this international and comparative 
analysis, CEDAW and international efforts for women’s representation.   First, 
this section will describe CEDAW and the international movement for quotas for 
women’s representation.  Second, it will analyze the distinction between hard and 
soft law and the extent to which CEDAW constitutes soft law.  Then it will 
explore various elements of CEDAW’s softness: its failure to foster adequate 
enforcement,11 the widespread use of reservations to opt out of basic principles, 
vagueness on basic issues, and a lack of sufficient resources.  This Part presents 
CEDAW to frame a later discussion of theories of internalization.    
 
A. CEDAW, the Almost-Universal Convention 
 
The advent of CEDAW arises from the formation of the United Nations.12 
Recognizing the need for a more comprehensive international agreement for 
women’s equality, drafters intended CEDAW to improve the social, economic, 
political, family and cultural status of women around the world.13 As of March 
19, 2005, 180 countries – over ninety percent of the members of the United 
Nations – have joined the Convention.14 As of September 15, 2005, the Optional 
 
11 On October 6, 1999, the United Nations General Assembly, acting without a vote, adopted a 21-
article Optional Protocol to the CEDAW.  See CEDAW, Optional Protocol to the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, available at 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/protocol/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2006). For a detailed 
discussion and analysis of the Optional Protocol, see infra notes ____ and accompanying text. 
12 Harold Hongju Koh, Why America Should Ratify the Women’s Rights Treaty (CEDAW), 34 
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 263, 264 (2002) [hereinafter Koh, CEDAW].  The Preamble to the 
United Nations Charter confirms the equal rights of men and women. Article One of the Charter 
states that the United Nation’s primary goal is “promoting and encouraging respect for human 
rights and for freedoms for all, without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.” 
Similarly, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights declared that rights adhere to all without 
regard to sex, among other characteristics. 
13 See id.  In 1979, the General Assembly, and later that year the United Nations, adopted 
CEDAW.  The following year, 64 countries signed CEDAW. 
14 See CEDAW, Members of the CEDAW Committee – 2005, available at 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/members.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2006). 
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Protocol, designed to improve CEDAW’s efficacy, has 76 Signatories and 72 
Parties.15 Although Saudi Arabia and many other countries with Shari'a-based 
legal systems have adopted CEDAW,16 the United States has not adopted the 
Convention or the Optional Protocol, despite substantial domestic support.17 The 
key provision of CEDAW requires signatories to report regularly their compliance 
with the treaty to the CEDAW Committee. 
 
B. CEDAW and Political Rights 
 
CEDAW provides for increasing women’s political participation and 
representation.  Article Seven provides:  
 
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination against women in the political and public life of 
the country and, in particular, shall ensure to women, on equal 
terms with men, the right: (a) To vote in all elections and 
 
15 See CEDAW, Signatures to and Ratifications of the Optional Protocol, available at 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/protocol/sigop.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2006).  
16 Saudi Arabia serves as an interesting example.  By 1990, women had the vote in nearly all 
democratic countries, and yet that year in Riyadh, a group of Saudi Arabian women felt compelled 
to dismiss their drivers and take the wheel themselves to protest laws preventing them from 
operating motor vehicles. They were briefly imprisoned and suspended from their jobs. See, 
http://search.eb.com/women/timeline?tocId=9404138&section=249219 (last visited Feb. 3, 2006).  
Ten years later, Saudi Arabia ratified the principal women’s rights convention on July 10, 2000, 
joining the overwhelming majority of countries around the world.  Yet Saudi Arabia attached a 
reservation: “[i]n case of contradiction between any term of the Convention and the norms of 
Islamic law, the Kingdom is not under obligation to observe the contradictory terms of the 
Convention.” Linda M. Keller, Symposium Article, The Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women: Evolution  and (non)Implementation Worldwide, 27 T. 
JEFFERSON L. REV. 35, 39 (2004). Despite the promotion of women’s political rights by CEDAW, 
Saudi Arabia only recently allowed some political rights for male citizens.  Adult male citizens 
age 21 or older may vote since registration began in November 2004 for partial municipal council 
elections held nationwide in 2005.  See 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/sa.html#Govt (last visited Feb. 3, 2006).  The 
democratic signatories to CEDAW have long granted suffrage regardless of sex.  See 
http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/suffrage.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2006).  Despite the high-minded 
rhetoric of Saudi Arabia’s women’s-rights proclamation; the practical realities for women in that 
country were not fundamentally transformed. 
17 See, Catherine Powell, supra note 8.  Harold Koh has argued that ratifying CEDAW could only 
further U.S. national commitments to eliminating gender discrimination.  The United States should 
have ratified CEDAW to demonstrate to the world that the United States is serious about ending 
discrimination against women.  See Koh, supra note 10. The United States’ failure to ratify 
CEDAW has reduced the United States’ global standing among European and Latin American 
allies. Id. 
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public referenda and to be eligible for election to all publicly 
elected bodies; (b) To participate in the formulation of 
government policy and the implementation thereof and to hold 
public office and perform all public functions at all levels of 
government; (c) To participate in non-governmental 
organizations and associations concerned with the public and 
political life of the country.18
The United Nations also made substantial efforts to focus attention on 
women’s representation during the “Decade for Women,” a decade which began 
in Nairobi in 1985 and ended in Beijing in 1995,19 in which specific calls for 
quotas to increase women’s representation drew widespread support.  In tandem 
with CEDAW, representation quotas have galvanized activists around the world 
to foster gender equality.20 Quotas attempt to increase women’s participation in 
politics or, in some cases, match their population proportionally.  The goal is to 
increase women’s representation in government, through the election of women to 
legislatures, mayoralties, governorships, and all other political office.21 This 
progress helped lay the groundwork for two of the movement’s successes: 
Brazil’s Quota Law of 1995 and France’s Parity Law of 2000.22
C.  Law and Gender: Hard and Soft 
 
Before examining the internalization of international gender norms, it is worth 
noting the extent to which the codification of these norms is soft.  First, it is 
 
18 See CEDAW, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 
art. 7, available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm (last visited 
Feb. 3, 2006). 
19 In particular, the Beijing conference led to a significant effort for parity worldwide.  Malheiros 
Miguel, supra note 1, at 47, citing Marisa Serrano, Address at Brasilia, Nov. 7, 1996.   
20 The term deployed in France and other countries is referred to as quotas in Brazil, possibly 
because the program in Brazil did not incorporate a full level of equality, and possibly because the 
term "quota" has a distinctly negative meaning in other languages.  
21 Scandinavia’s legislation and increases in actual representation provided this movement with 
early successes in the 1980s.  As other European countries slowly followed suit, Ireland required 
that 40% of candidates from political parties be women. In Latin America, Argentina became the 
first country to adopt parity quotas, doing so in 1991. See Malheiros Miguel, supra note 1, at 175. 
22 Several methods have been used by quota advocates.  For example, Brazil and France have 
established requirements for political parties to present women candidates.  The “Reservation Bill” 
in India, on the other hand, is a proposal that would guarantee a full one third of seat in the 
parliament to women. Sumita Ray, The Women’s Reservation Bill of India: A Political Movement 
toward Equality for Women, 13 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 53 (1999). Other laws provide for 
assisting women candidates to increase their success ratios.  Id. 
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imperative that we define what “soft law” is, how CEDAW qualifies as “soft,” 
and how international women’s political rights fall under the CEDAW “soft” 
rubric.  Hard law has been defined as legally binding obligations that are precise 
and that delegate authority for interpreting and implementing the law.23 “Soft 
law,” on the other hand, has been defined as legal arrangements that are weakened 
along one or more of the dimensions of obligations, precision, and delegation.24 
Diverse international instruments qualify as soft law.25 The use of the generic 
term “soft law” oversimplifies the diversity of these instruments,26which vary in 
form, language, subject matter, participants, addressees, purposes and monitoring 
procedures.27 Although non-binding, vague and weakly enforced, soft law 
instruments provide some advantages and play a significant role in the 
formulation of international law.28
International scholar  Kal Raustiala has argued that there is “no such thing 
as soft law.” 29 For Raustiala, the nominally nonbinding agreements are 
“pledges” and the defective binding agreements are contracts that have been 
 
23 KENNETH W. ABBOTT & DUNCAN SNIDAL, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, in 
LEGALIZATION AND WORLD POLITICS 36 (Judith Goldstein, Miles Kahler, Robert O. Keohane, 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, eds.)(2001). The advantages of choosing hard law include reduction of 
transactional costs, strengthening the credibility of the commitments of states, expanding states’ 
available political strategies, and resolving problems of incomplete contracting.  Id. at 38. Hard 
law arises when substantial benefits come with cooperation but may suffer from opportunism or 
high costs.  Hard law requires high credibility of commitments when noncompliance cannot be 
detected.  Hard law draws on issues that require national as well as international resolve.  Id. at 45-
46.
24 Id. 
25 C.M. Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law, 38 
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 850 (1989).  
26 Id. For example, some are treaties that include soft-binding obligations while others are 
resolutions that are non-binding. Others are statements prepared by individuals in a non-
governmental capacity but which purport to lay down international principles. 
27 Id. “These variables, coupled with the inherent contradictions in any concept of soft law, 
highlight the challenges presented to the structure and substance of the traditional international 
legal order by the increasing use of soft law forms.”  Id.
28 Id. at 865.  Although the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does not require treaties 
between States to create any identifiable rights and obligations, it does not distinguish between the 
diverging purposes of hard and soft treaties. Such differences impede the construction of a 
uniform framework for the analysis of soft law.  Id. at 851-52. Low drafting costs and easier 
agreement through facilitated compromise permits “mutually beneficial cooperation, between 
actors with different interests and values, different time horizons and discount rates, and different 
degrees of power.”  Id. at 38-39.  Soft law permits international actors to anticipate other 
participants’ actions, allowing for more reasoned choices.  Id.
29 Raustiala, supra note 6, at 586-87. 
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constructed to be shallow.30 Applying Raustiala’s theory to CEDAW, it appears 
to contain more pledge-like characteristics.  In this context, the term “pledge” 
provides some escape from the gender-imbued epithet “soft.”  However, this 
paper will continue the use of the appropriately-maligned term “soft law” for two 
reasons.  First, as an adjective, “soft” permits varying degrees of “softness.”  
Second, although the term “soft law” suffers from inadequacies, CEDAW’s 
complex role in the international sphere requires an explicit account of the 
derogatory role to which it has been consigned.  As Christine Chinkin and Hilary 
Charlesworth have argued, international law marginalizes women’s rights both 
“as the ‘soft’ issues of human rights and are developed through ‘soft’ modalities 
of law-making.”31 
According to Raustiala, soft law encompasses two types of agreements —
those that are nominally nonbinding and those that are binding but defective.  
Although CEDAW illustrates the world’s willingness to end discrimination 
against women, most states would not have acceded it if it were a hard law.  It 
binds states legally, but they are not obligated to follow the recommendations of 
the CEDAW Committee.  Drafting CEDAW as a soft law allowed numerous 
States to join the Convention while maintaining their sovereignty or their robust 
view of what constitutes it, and avoiding zealous enforcement of its terms. 
Critics argue that reservations and vagueness hobble CEDAW.  More 
States have ratified CEDAW with reservations than almost any other human 
rights treaty.32 Although reservations are allowed if they are not “incompatible 
with the object and purpose of the present Convention,”33 the Convention 
 
30 Id. at 587.  Raustiala goes on to say “This categorical distinction between pledge and contract is 
more faithful to negotiators’ intentions and more useful analytically, because it permits us to 
evaluate law’s relative influence and role.”  Id.
31 HILARY CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: A
FEMINIST ANALYSIS 66 (2000). 
32 See Jennifer Riddle, Note, Making CEDAW Universal: A Critique of CEDAW’s Reservation 
Regime Under Article 28 and the Effectiveness of the Reporting Process, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. 
REV. 605 (2002).   “Of the United Nations’ human rights treaties, CEDAW has attracted the 
greatest number of reservations with the potential to modify or exclude most, if not all, of the 
terms of the treaty.”  Id. at 606 (quoting United Nations, Division for the Advancement of 
Women, State Parties to CEDAW, available at 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/states.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2006)).  As of 2002, 
fifty-five States filed reservations, and another fourteen States initially entered reservations but 
subsequently withdrew them. Id. at 606. .
33 See Laboni Amena Hoq, Note, The Women’s Convention and its Optional Protocol: 
Empowering Women to Claim Their Internationally Protected Rights, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 677, 688 (2001) [hereinafter The Women’s Convention].  
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provides no mechanism to determine a violation.34 The Convention’s failure to 
impose limitations or implement procedures to restrict reservations has led to 
numerous reservations by signatories that undermine CEDAW’s purpose.35 
Critics also argue that the duties of signatories are vague and unclear,36 
permitting widespread non-compliance.37 The Optional Protocol to the Women's 
Convention adopted in 1999,38 does not allow any reservations (perhaps the cause 
for its ratification by only 72 states)39 but does offer two new enforcement 
mechanisms: 1) the communications procedure, permitting individuals and groups 
to complain directly to CEDAW, and 2) the inquiry procedure, enabling CEDAW 
to investigate serious and systematic abuses within states.40 Although the 
Protocol increases the power of the Convention, states may opt out of the inquiry 
procedure,41 limiting the Protocol’s power to communications procedures - 
complaints by individuals or groups.  Article 10 limits the Protocol’s 
effectiveness, allowing states to disregard CEDAW’s investigation of 
complaints.42 CEDAW, even after the Protocol, has no power to sanction 
behavior.43 Even if CEDAW were permitted to investigate, it could not force 
compliance.44
34 Id. In addition, the Convention fails to provide CEDAW with the authority to evaluate or limit 
reservations that violate Article 28. Furthermore, there are no procedural limitations on making 
reservations. Id. 
35 See Riddle, supra note 50, at 627; see also Martinez, supra note 49, at 175; Julia Ernst, U.S. 
Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 299, 337-40 (1995); Ritz, supra note 46, at 207-08. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. State Parties could claim that the determination of “appropriate means” should be left to the 
States themselves and each State should independently determine what is appropriate. Id. Thus, 
States that do not comply with the Convention’s affirmative duties could escape sanctions by 
claiming that they have taken appropriate measures that they deemed necessary to fulfill their 
obligations under the Convention. 
38 See The Women’s Convention, supra note 51, at 678; see also Ritz, supra note 46, at 208-09. 
39 See Keller, supra note 14at 38; The Women’s Convention, supra note 51, at 678; see also Ritz, 
supra note 46, at 208-09. 
40 See The Women’s Convention, supra note 51, at 678; see also, Riddle, supra note 50; Keller, 
supra note 14.  Although the Protocol allows CEDAW to initiate investigations against State 
parties, CEDAW, must first invite the cooperation of the State it seeks to investigate and the State 
must consent to any visit. Id. at 38. 
41 See Keller, supra note 14, at 38; see also Ritz, supra note 46, at 209-10. 
42 See Riddle, supra note 50, at 634. 
43 Id.; See also Ritz, supra note 46, at 211-14. 
44 Id., at 210-11, 211-14. Perhaps equally as damaging as these weak provisions, CEDAW lacks 
sufficient resources. See Riddle, supra note 50, at 629; see also Ernst, supra note 56, at 346-48.  
Article 20 imposes a two-week limit on CEDAW to consider country reports, preventing thorough 
consideration.  Delays and substantial noncompliance hamper its efforts.  See Riddle, at 627; see 
also Ernst, at 346-48.  Some also point to the fact that CEDAW’s office, isolated in Vienna, sits 
Deleted: 59
Deleted: 56
Deleted: 56
Deleted: ,
Deleted: 56
Deleted: 60
Deleted: See Keller, supra note 14,
Deleted: 56
Deleted: 60
Deleted: 56
Deleted: See Ritz, supra note 56
Deleted: 60
Deleted: 69
Deleted: {W:\DOCS\NJPC\0000\jody\
00007041.DOC}
ROSENBLUM – INTERNALIZING GENDER  
11 
CEDAW is, in effect, neither binding nor effective, evidenced by a recent 
report showing that over forty-five countries around the world, most of which 
have ratified or acceded to CEDAW, have laws that explicitly discriminate 
against women.45 Some scholars may dismiss this as a sui generis combination in 
the particularly challenging context of gender.  Although the “softness” of 
CEDAW reflects the contested relationship between gender and rights, it also 
presents an opportunity to examine theories of internalization and how 
comparative methodologies would contribute to understanding those processes. 
 
II. Comparative Internalization of International Norms 
 
In the midst of American self-absorption and xenophobia, international 
law and comparative law may appear indistinguishably foreign.46 Both 
disciplines inherently engage in border-crossing, yet sit on the margins of United 
States lawmaking.  Yet, surprisingly, both appear to reject interaction.  Separated 
at birth, they want for greater interdisciplinary engagement.  Legal scholars fortify 
the sharp lines between these two diverging disciplines.47
International scholarship examines state obligations to follow international 
law, the precision of international instruments, and the delegation by states to 
resolve enforcement issues.48 Comparative law, in contrast, explores other legal 
 
far from other human rights treaty bodies in Geneva, depriving it of the United Nations’ full 
attention.  See Riddle, supra note 50, at 627. Critics have argued that CEDAW’s lack of sufficient 
resources and meeting time further inhibits CEDAW from fully implementing the Convention.  
See Riddle, supra note 50, at 627; see also Ernst, supra note 56, at 346-48. 
45 See Ritz, supra note 46, at 200. 
46 See Catherine Valcke, On Globalization - Global Law Teaching, 54 J. LEGAL ED. 160, 162 
(2004) (the author asserts that international law and comparative law are often used 
interchangeably in the literature).  
47 See Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to International Lawmaking: The Tale of Three 
Trade Finance Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 125, 189 (2005). 
48 Diane P. Wood, Diffusion and Focus in International Law Scholarship, 1, CHI. J. INT’L L. 141, 
142-43 (2000) (international law “may be defined as the body of rules and principles of action 
which are binding upon civilized states in their relations with one another”) (internal citations 
omitted); Melissa A. Waters Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational Judicial 
Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 GEO. L.J. 487, 502 (2005) 
(international law scholarship focuses primarily on state compliance with international law). 
International law concerns not only relations among states, but the law of international 
organizations. See Ronald C. Slye, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 59, 77 (2001); Allyn L. Taylor, Governing 
the Globalization of Public Health, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 500 (2004); Maura Mullen de Bolivar, 
A Comparison of Protecting the Environmental Interests of Latin-American Indigenous 
Communities from Transnational Corporations under International Human Rights and 
Environmental Law, 8 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 105, 148 (1998). 
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regimes and the differences and similarities among them,49 explicitly drawing on 
several methodologies.  Comparative law recognizes cultural relativity, while 
international instruments emphasize universality.  Comparative scholars generally 
focus on analysis at the state level or among states,50 but not at the international 
level.  International law scholars rarely attend to the differences raised by 
comparative scholarship.51 Despite occasional overlap, the disciplines of 
comparative law and international law generally function as if one bore no 
relevance to the other, arising from largely separate communities of scholars.52 
Internalization is where these two disciplines meet.  This Part will first 
discuss internalization, including theories of compliance and recent skepticism 
over the efficacy of international law.  Second, it will present the challenges 
posed to international law by comparative methods.  Third, it will present how 
these challenges may present opportunities to the development of international 
law, including the potential for acculturation in a rapidly globalizing world.    
Comparative law holds significant potential to understand how nations internalize 
international norms.  
 
A. The Internalization of International Norms 
 
The enforcement of international law depends on internalization.  Only 
when states internalize international law do they establish internally binding 
domestic legal obligations.53 Without this “norm-internalization,”54 international 
law lacks substantial impact.  International law theories suggest many different 
reasons and means for this norm internalization.  Neorealists attack the very 
 
49 See Amy Fraley, Child Sex Tourism Legislation Under the Protect Act: Does it Really Protect, 
79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 445, 461 (2005).  
50 See Vernon Valentine Palmer, From Lerotholi to Lando: Some Examples of Comparative Law 
Methodology, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 261, 262-63 (2005); David Kennedy, New Approaches to 
Comparative Law: Comparativism and International Governance, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 545, 547 
(2001); see also Kurt Taylor Gaubatz & Mathew MacArthur, How International is ‘International’ 
Law?, 22 MICH. J. INT’L L. 239, 244-45 (2001). 
51 See Gaubatz & MacArthur, supra note 90, at 244.  
52 Id.  (the authors distinguish between international law scholars and comparative law based on 
the focus of their studies); see also, Levit, supra note 51. (the divergence in treatment of the two 
types of laws is clearly shown by the curriculums of law schools in the United States where 
international law courses are regarded as distinct from comparative law studies); Igor Stramignoni, 
Francesco’s Devilish Venus: Notations on the Matter of Legal Space, 41 CAL. W. L. REV. 147, 
237 (distinguishing international and comparative law in that international law is directed at the 
public – the foreign nation state as an official while comparative law is directed at the private – at 
each nation’s legal past). 
53 Koh, Why Do Nations Obey, supra note 36, at 2659. 
54 Id. at 2646. 
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notion that states would observe international law, arguing that they do so only to 
the extent that it coincides with their interests as rational actors.55 Other 
international scholars defend international law’s role, as Louis Henkin argued, 
“[i]t is probably the case that almost all nations observe almost all principles of 
international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time.”56
This subsection presents one of the crucial debates within international 
law: whether states internalize international norms, and if so, whether 
international law plays a role in this internalization.  
 
1. The Internalization of International Norms 
 
Internalization theory draws on compliance literature.  States comply with 
international law when they have engaged in the “norm internalization” necessary 
for international law to draw on state power.  Traditionally, compliance with 
international law includes moral, normative, and legal aspects as well as a concept 
of obedience.57 State sovereignty dominates the compliance debate, as parties 
relate to each other in contract law.58
55 Neorealism is a theory of international relations which was largely outlined by Kenneth Waltz 
in his 1979 work Theory of International Politics. The theory assumes that a state’s desire for 
survival is the primary factor driving their actions, and suggests that nations will be reluctant to 
cooperate with other states for fear of losing their position in the global hierarchy or becoming 
dependant on another state.  See generally KENNETH WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL 
POLITICS (1979).    See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH AND ERIC POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (2005). 
56 LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979) (emphasis omitted). 
57 Koh, Why Do Nations Obey, supra note 36, at 2659. 
58 “Traditional scholars . . . . view international law largely in terms of contractual relations, 
therefore assigning to the ‘sovereign’ a central place in the construction of the two orders.”  Id. at 
2607.  Legitimacy under the Traditional View is based on the notion of justice—“”[t]he very 
concept of obligatory custom assumed that nations, by virtue of their sovereign statehood, had de 
facto consented to compliance with customary practices out of a sense of legal obligation.” See id. 
at 2608. 
Deleted: 88
Deleted: tend to draw a fundamental 
conceptual boundary between municipal 
and international law, and
Deleted: 
Deleted: {W:\DOCS\NJPC\0000\jody\
00007041.DOC}
ROSENBLUM – INTERNALIZING GENDER  
14 
Scholars have devised many theories to explain compliance.59 A crucial, 
and increasingly prominent divide is whether international law affects state 
behavior.  On one side, realists assert, international law serves “an arena for 
acting out power relationships between self-interested state actors bent on 
maintaining (and increasing) their own relative power in the system.”60 To the 
extent international law affects state behavior, it is the consequence of powerful 
states forcing the compliance of less powerful states.61 On the other side of the 
debate stand various theories elaborating how international law may affect state 
behavior, including liberalism,62 democratic process,63 the strategic school,64 
managerial theory,65 transformational theory,66 and transnational theory.67 
59 Koh argues that there are “three distinct exploratory pathways” in the current compliance 
literature.  Id. at 2632. Others argue that there are additional or alternate paths. Beth Simmons 
identifies four different theories of international relations, realism, rational functionalism, 
democratic legalism, and normative means for compliance ,and ultimately argues that “these four 
broad approaches…provide a useful way to arrange the growing literature on compliance with 
international agreements.” Beth A. Simmons, Compliance With International Law, 1 AMER. REV.
POLIT. SCI. 77 (1998). George Downs and Andrea Trento expand upon Koh’s work in order to 
characterize seven different perspectives.George W. Downs & Andrea W. Trento, Conceptual 
Issues Surrounding the Compliance Gap, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION: CLOSING 
THE COMPLIANCE GAP 19 (Edward Larek & Michael Doyle eds., 2004).
60 JACK GOLDSMITH AND ERIC POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005). 
61 This pressure could be economic (in the form of sanctions) or it could manifest in the 
withholding by the powerful state of military or financial aid. Id.
62 The second perspective, the Kantian liberal school of thought, is represented by commentators 
like Thomas Franck and argues that “a state’s decision to comply with an international law is 
determined by its perception of a law’s procedural and substantive ‘fairness.’” Id.; see also
Franck, supra note 108, at 5.  An adherent to this view might argue that the reason for non-
compliance is that all states except the most powerful and developed lack a real voice in the 
formation of “multilateral regulatory standards and that, as a result, these standards are both far 
from their ‘ideal point’ and are insensitive to the problems that they face in trying to comply.”  
Downs & Trento, supra, at 27.  Without an equal voice in international agreements, these smaller 
states will have a low compliance rate.  Id. at 28.
63 Third, the democratic process school connects the state’s internal government to compliance, 
arguing that “liberal or democratic states regularly comply more willingly with international law 
because the rule of law is ingrained in them.” Id. at 28.  In addition, the “transparency of their 
governmental structure operates to ensure that they will implement the provisions of any treaty 
that [has] been ratified by domestic due process,” and expects that other democracies will also 
comply.  Id.
64 The fourth perspective, the strategic school, focuses on the costs for defecting.  Id. at 29.  The 
former might be accomplished through subsidies or financial aid tied to compliance, while the 
latter might be done by increasing the punishment for non-compliance.  Id.
65  The fifth perspective, the managerial theory, of Abram and Antonia Chayes, attributes non-
compliance to “complicating external factors,” including treaty ambiguity, administrative and/or 
financial incapacity of states to implement agreements.  Id. at 29. Incentives rather than 
punishment increase compliance. Id. at 29-30.  In the long run, these scholars believe that 
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The last theory, by Harold Koh, is in some ways the most assertive, 
centering on a state’s incorporation into its own legal system international norms. 
According to Harold Koh, “[a] transnational actor’s moral obligation to obey an 
international norm becomes an internally binding domestic legal obligation when 
that norm has been interpreted and internalized into its domestic legal system.”68
Theorizing internalization has grown more complicated with the fluidity of 
sovereignty and the blurring of different actors’ roles.  Koh’s own idea of 
transnationalism, argues that compliance draws on the “process by which norms 
established at the international level are internalized at the domestic level and 
become indistinguishable from domestic norms.”69 Koh’s transnationalist 
approach proposes a theory for the individual steps of the internalization process.  
First, transnational actors must first initiate contact with a state actor.  This 
interaction gives way to the second phase, interpretation of the global norm 
applicable to the interaction.  The transnational actor then seeks to accomplish the 
third phase, internalization of the new interpretation of the norm into the state 
actor’s system of government.70 The final phase of internalization is obedience.71 
providing financial incentives will create “better-funded and more politically responsive 
international bureaucracies.”  Id. at 30. Still other competing theories of compliance that have 
been proposed include the “managerial” and “fairness” models.  See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA 
HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY (1995); THOMAS FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995). 
66 Transformationalism asserts that the increasing “long-term interest in preserving a law-based 
international community” leads to compliance.  Id. Non-compliance will eventually decrease as 
“problematic states become re-socialized to more progressive internationalist values.” Id. Here, 
the focus is usually not on short-term compliance problems.  When this issue is confronted, 
adherents generally advocate for the managerial approach described above.  Id.
67 The transnationalist school is largely the creation of Koh.  This approach argues that in order to 
understand compliance, the “process by which norms established at the international level are 
internalized at the domestic level and become indistinguishable from domestic norms,” must be 
understood. Id.
68 Id. The institutions that arose after the Second World War still define international law’s 
framework to include numerous parties, including intergovernmental institutions. Id. at 2614.  
Although Cold War tensions substantially weakened the system, a “transnational relations” period 
of compliance arose in the 1970s and 1980s and resulted in substantial growth in international 
regimes and institutions, as well as nongovernmental actors. Id. at 2615.  Following the Cold War, 
a “New World Order” emerged.  ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2005).  
69 Id.
70 Koh, Why Do Nations Obey, supra note 36, at 2602. The purpose of this is to “bind” the state 
actor into following the interpretation: Koh terms this “obedience” rather than “coercion.”  Id. The 
transnational actor can be a public or private individual, or an organization.  Id. at 2648.  
Internalization can be social, as  when a norm acquires so much public acceptance or legitimacy 
that there is widespread general obedience.  Political internalization occurs when political actors or 
elites accept a norm and adopt it as governmental policy.  Finally, legal internalization occurs 
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“Transnational norm entrepreneurs” (individual or non-governmental 
entities) set in motion the process of internalization in both their home and in 
other countries by creating popular and political support for the norm in their 
home country, setting up parallel organizations in other countries, and persuading 
individuals in foreign countries that a norm is universal. 72 Ultimately, these 
norms are internalized by an arm of the state: the legislative, executive, or judicial 
branch, or the bureaucracy.73
A related theory of internalization is acculturation.74 “Acculturation,” or 
the process through which individuals/groups adopt the behaviors and beliefs of a 
surrounding culture,75 can be “harnessed” by institutions in order to “socialize 
recalcitrant states” into complying with international norms,76 especially in the 
area of human rights (welfare, labor policy, education).77 Individual states will 
conform to these standards in an effort to gain respect at the international level.78 
when a norm is incorporated into a domestic legal system by judicial interpretation, legislative 
action, executive agreement, or some combination of the three. Id.
71 Harold H. Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. 
REV. 623 (1998) [hereinafter Koh, Bringing International Law Home]. Adherence to the first three 
stages will lead to a perception on the part of the second actor that they now have an internal 
obligation to adhere to the norm and will therefore obey it. Using Koh’s transnational model as a 
basis, Steven Ratner argues that Koh’s idea of the “governmental norm sponsor” who “helps push 
states to comply” with the norms also applies to agents of governmental organizations, like the 
High Commissioner on National Minorities of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE).  See Steven Ratner, Does International Law Matter in Preventing Ethnic 
Conflict?, 32 INT’L L. & POL. 591, 594 (2000).    
72 Rex Glensey, Quasi-Global Social Norms, 38 CONN. L. REV. 79, 86-87 (2005). 
73 Id. The myriad permutations of governmental internalization have been studied by a number of 
scholars.  Melissa Waters argues that domestic courts are increasingly “becoming active 
participants in the dynamic process of developing international law.” See Waters, supra note 93, at 
490.  In the same vein, Edward Re argues that one way to improve norm creation and implicitly 
internalization, would be a “transnational judicial dialogue,” in which networks of domestic courts 
worldwide would discuss key issues informally.  See Edward Re, The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights: Effective Remedies and the Domestic Courts, 33 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 137, 138-39 
(2003).   Other theorists argue that bureaucracies may solve the problem of internalizing 
international norms, either through international organizations or domestic bureaucratic 
institutions.  See Amichai Cohen, Bureaucratic Internalization: Domestic Governmental Agencies 
and the Legitimization of International Law, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1079 (2005).  International 
organizations like the World Bank act as non-state actors which can cooperate with state actors to 
internalize international norms domestically.  See Galit Sarfaty, The World Bank and the 
Internalization of Indigenous Rights Norms, 114 YALE L.J. 1791, 1792-93 (2005).  
74 See infra Part IV.
75 See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International 
Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 638 (2004). 
76 Id. at 638-39. 
77 Id. at 648-50.  Women’s rights, for example, can be used to demonstrate the convergence of 
state policy worldwide: “once universal suffrage became a legitimating principle associated with 
Deleted: (PIN CITE)
Deleted: Melissa 
Deleted: Mediating Norms and 
Identity: The Role of Transnational 
Judicial Dialogue in Creating and 
Enforcing International Law, 93 GEO.
L.J. 487, 490 (2005).  
Deleted: {W:\DOCS\NJPC\0000\jody\
00007041.DOC}
ROSENBLUM – INTERNALIZING GENDER  
17 
2. Internalization Skepticism 
 
Koh and his supporters argue that states comply with international norms 
only when those norms have been effectively internalized at the domestic level.  
Transnational approaches evoke broad skepticism by realists.  Their argument, 
that states only act in their own interest, stands in stark contrast to the concept of 
internalization.  
The implication is that powerful states that find the non-compliance of less 
powerful states to be a problem will pressure these states to comply.  This 
pressure could be economic (in the form of sanctions) or it could manifest in the 
withholding by the powerful state of military or financial aid.79For example, 
realists view compliance by focusing on states’ self-interest and would argue that 
“what governments are legally bound to do or refrain from doing has little bearing 
on their actual behavior, except as provided by a coincidence of law and national 
interest.”80 
In The Limits of International Law, Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner posit 
the theory that “international law emerges from states acting rationally to 
maximize their interests, given their perceptions of the interests of other states and 
the distribution of state power.”81 Beginning from the assumption that states will 
make rational choices in order to further their own interests,82 and rejecting the 
idea that states follow customary international law from some sense of legal 
obligation,83 they argue instead that some combination of the four models of state 
relations (coincidence of interest, coordination, cooperation, and coercion) can 
 
the modern nation-state, state enactment of women’s suffrage followed a pattern anticipated by 
theories of acculturation.” Id. at 650-51. 
78 Goodman and Jinks use the examples of environmental protection and public education to 
demonstrate their hypothesis, pointing out in the former case that many states have similar 
organizational features (what they term “isomorphism”) to implement environmental goals and 
join interstate or intergovernmental environmental organizations. Id.  These developments at the 
state level occurred in response to the development of “national environmental protection” in the 
global society as a legitimate goal. Id.  Public education is a similar case study: to demonstrate 
their place in the global society, states develop isomorphic curricula and have “embraced” the 
belief or value of the society that the primary purpose of the state should be to educate. Id. Here, 
states are organizational entities in the context of a global culture, consisting of a broader social 
environment, wishing to present themselves as legitimate actors in this global society.  See Ryan 
Goodman & Derek Jinks, Toward an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1749, 
1752, 1762 (2003). 
79 Id.
80 See Simmons, supra note 108, at 79-80.     
81 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 102, at 1
82 See id. at 2.  
83 Id. at 42.  The authors explain that they do not claim that customary international law does not 
exist; rather, merely that it does not influence state behavior.  Id. at 42-43.    
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explain state behavior.84 Goldsmith and Posner question treaty utility from a 
realist perspective: since states act to maximize their own rational self-interest, 
they will only comply with treaties where the treaty goals coincide with state 
interests.  Contrary to Koh’s theory, they suggest that while states will delegate 
the task of achieving treaty compliance to bureaucracies, this delegation will not 
lead to internalization.85 Goldsmith and Posner also criticize the idea that states 
have a moral obligation to comply with international law and will do so even 
when it is not in their best interests to do so,86 arguing that moral obligation does 
not exist under international law.87 In sum, Goldsmith and Posner assert that 
state’s own rational self-interests always trump international law. 
Another prominent critic of international law’s efficacy, Oona Hathaway, 
questions treaty utility arguing that without real international enforcement, states 
have little incentive to make costly policy changes.88 States may ratify human 
rights treaties to conform to international expectations, but the consequent 
reduction in international pressure often leads to less actual compliance.89 
Hathaway, while agreeing that the transnationalist model can help explain why 
states obey human rights norms even where it is in their best interest not to, 
suggests that the model “loses some predictive power” when attempting to 
 
84 Id. at 11-13.  The first model, coincidence of interest, occurs “when a pattern of 
behavior…results from each state acting in its own self-interest without any regard to the action of 
the other state.” Id. at 12. The second, coordination, occurs when states clarify some point so that 
they can “plan accordingly and avoid conflict.”  Id. Cooperation is the third model, and occurs 
when each state agrees, either explicitly or implicitly, on a solution “that reflects their interests and 
capacities.”  States will then “reciprocally refrain from activities…that would otherwise be in their 
immediate self-interest in order to reap larger medium- or long-term benefits.”  Id. Finally, the 
fourth model is coercion.  This results “when a powerful state (or coalition of states with 
convergent interests) forces weaker states to engage in acts that are contrary to their interests.”  Id.
85 See id. at 104.  Goldsmith and Posner state that “[t]here is little empirical evidence for this 
view.”  Id. They point out that bureaucratic compliance usually comes down to a cost-benefit 
analysis: bureaucracies comply when the cost-benefit analysis favors compliance and do not 
comply when it doesn’t.  Id. at 104-05.      
86 Id. at 185.     
87 Id. The authors reject the traditional consent explanation for moral obligation (i.e., states have 
an obligation to comply with international law because they have consented to it).  Id. at 189.     
88 Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 2020 
(2002).      .
89 Id. Hathaway notes that this may be even more pronounced in the context of regional human 
rights treaties.  Hathaway does caution, however, that treaties may have broader effects on other 
countries (by influencing the thinking of those countries as to what constitutes acceptable 
behavior) or long-term effects on the ratifying countries (by giving Koh’s “norm entrepreneurs” 
the opportunity to create interactions that will lead to the eventual internalization of the norm).  Id.
at 2021-22.
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determine which norms will be internalized.90 Koh’s model fails to define which 
norms are internalized and which are not.  Hathaway states that treaties operate on 
both an instrumental and an expressive level, aspects that are “divorced”: while 
pressure exists to demonstrate a commitment to human rights norms, little 
incentive exists for ratifying countries to follow the treaty goals. .9192 
Hathaway’s critique serves as an important base on which to build a 
broader, comparative critique of internalization theory as premised on cultural 
generalities that may apply, but only in certain parts of certain states.  However, 
different as her critique is from Goldsmith and Posner’s, both ignore the primary 
role that cultural differences play in the internalization of international law.  
Internalization, particularly in the area of gender norms, cannot really occur 
without a clear understanding of these differences.  It is in this area that 
comparative law can be most useful.          
 
B. Comparative Perspectives on Internalization 
 
Assessing internalization requires the comparative techniques to 
understand different countries’ legal systems.  It is through comparative 
methodologies that we can understand how states internalize international norms, 
and whether international law causes this internalization.  Comparative 
knowledge brings complexity to internalization theory, undermining presumptions 
of a direct connection between drafters of international law and national legal 
enforcement.  Like international skeptics, comparative perspectives bring a 
critical note to the understanding of internalization, although in a very different 
vein.  This subpart first explores comparative methodologies, revealing the 
theoretical and practical challenges they pose to internalization theory.  It then 
presents a potentially fruitful interaction between these two disciplines that may 
serve a constructive role in international law debates such as internalization.  
Comparative law may make substantial contributions to international law more 
broadly, but this article focuses on the area of internalization because it is here 
that the two disciplines interact most closely.  
 
90 Id. at 1961-62  
91 Id. at 2020.  She defines the expressive function of treaties as having two distinct aspects: a 
legal one (treaties define the conduct and norms of civilized nations for the international 
community) and a political one (a country that ratify a treaty “declares to the world that the 
principles outlined in the treaty are consistent with the ratifying government’s commitment to 
human rights,”). Id. at 2005-06.  The dual function of treaties can be synergistic or antagonistic, 
depending on the country’s commitment to the goals of the treaty and the enforcement 
mechanisms it puts in place to ensure compliance.  Id. at 2006.  
92 Id. at 2007-09.   
Deleted: 
Deleted: 
Deleted: Oona Hathaway, Do Human 
Rights Treaties Make a Difference, 111 
YALE L.J. 1935,
Deleted: . (2002).     
Deleted: {W:\DOCS\NJPC\0000\jody\
00007041.DOC}
ROSENBLUM – INTERNALIZING GENDER  
20 
Comparative knowledge complicates the simplicity of this model – the 
interpretation of the global norm must necessarily go through a translation 
process.  Local actors must interpret a global norm to apply it to their state laws.93 
Internalization’s process entails revision of global norms.  As religious studies 
have documented the way in which religions take on a local flavor,94 internalized 
international norms necessarily are syncretic, reflecting local values at least as 
much as transnational ones.  Finally, the obedience would follow the rule of the 
locally translated text, not that of the original international norm.  
 
1.   Comparative Methodologies 
 
Comparative law appears to be incessantly dying of a near-empty dance 
card, unpopular and self-doubting.95 Periods of rebirth do occur,96 as comparative 
law retains theoretical underpinnings that draw on a deep passion for 
understanding foreign legal systems.97 Comparative scholarship’s many 
methodologies each provide insights into internalization.98 Three groups of 
 
93 See, infra note 114. 
94 Latin American Catholic practices in particular reflect a syncretic relationship between religion 
and local culture, as the flourishing of saints and santería draw on local culture as much as 
Catholic mythology.   
95 See Catherine A. Rogers, Gulliver’s Troubled Travels, or the Conundrum of Comparative Law,
67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 149, 150-51 (1998) (citing UGO MATTEI, COMPARATIVE LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 97 (1997); William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (I): What Was It Like to Try a 
Rat?, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1889, 1965 (1995); Basil Markesinis, Comparative Law - A Subject in 
Search of an Audience, 53 MOD. L. REV. 1, 21 (1990)).     
96 Annelise Riles, Wigmore’s Treasure Box: Comparative Law in the Era of Information, 40 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 221, 222 (1999). See also Paula Giliker, The Enigma of Comparative Law: 
Variations on a Theme for the Twenty-First Century and Methodology of Comparative Law, 55 
INT’L & COMP. L.W. 243, 243 (2006) (book review) [hereinafter The Enigma of Comparative 
Law; Rogers, supra note 157, at 150-51. 
97 Riles, supra note 158, at 222.  See also Giliker, supra note 158 (the author of the book, Esin 
Örücü, discusses the difficulties that academics and students encounter in undertaking comparative 
research). Comparative law provides “a glimpse into the origins of legal norms; the prospect of a 
better understanding of the efficacy and limits of law; and the hope of insight into the connections 
among law, behavior, ideas, and power.” Riles, supra note 158, at 238-39 (1999). 
98 Mathias Reimann organizes comparative methods differently, grouping the knowledge 
accumulated in three categories: 1) describing law, 2) mapping law, and 3) comparing law. See 
Mathias Reimann, The Progress and Failure of Comparative Law in the Second Half of the 
Twentieth Century, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 671, 675-83 (2002). Most comparative work falls into 
description of foreign law.  Mapping law involves dynamic models of families, traditions, and 
cultures.  Mapping still relies on classification but such comparative work begins to look beyond 
legal systems as “static and isolated entities.”  Id.  Finally, comparing law involves both traditional 
approaches and post-modern critiques.  Id. 
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scholars, each with its own methodology, are: Functionalists, Context scholars, 
and Discourse scholars.99 
First, “Functionalists,” perhaps comparative law’s dominant school,100 
endeavor to determine the social function of a particular rule or institution.  With 
a functional equivalent in hand,101 they then compare rules and/or institutions.102 
Functionalists inquire how norms and their origins differ between jurisdictions.  
Functionalists also seek to determine the social function of law in general.103 As a 
defining comparative school, Functionalists face criticism by other comparativists 
of eurocentrism104 and inappropriately loose comparisons.105 
A second group, “Context scholars,” seek local meaning, interpreting law 
and its relationship to culture,106 incorporating interdisciplinary knowledge.107 
Cultural immersion often accompanies such scholarship, requiring fluency in the 
 
99 Here, I rely largely on Annelise Riles’ categorization of the field, which provides both a 
methodological and a cultural distinction among these groups, recognizing the role that 
subjectivity plays in scholarly production.  Riles, supra note 158, at 231-51.  Fabio Morosini 
categorizes the methods of comparataive law analysis in a different way, arguing that two different 
schools exist. See Fabio Morosini, Globalization & Law: Beyond Traditional Methodology of 
Comparative Legal Studies and an Example from Private International Law, 13 CARDOZO J. INT’L
& COMP. L. 541, 546 (2005). The first, the convergence approach, focuses on the similarities 
between two more legal systems. Id. The second, the non-convergence approach, aims at 
distinguishing different legal systems by looking at the differences between two or more legal 
systems. Id. See also Pierre Legrand, The Present State of America’s Europe: Law: Paradoxically, 
Derrida: For a Comparative Legal Studies, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 631, 665, 705 (2005) 
(comparatists refer to other legal studies of the law not because they do not know other 
methodologies but also because they do not want to know. “Otherness-in-the-law is not simple 
ignorance; rather, it assumes a prescience of what it is that one does not want to know.”).   
100 Riles, supra note 158, at 232.  For example, Riles states that the authors of most comparative 
law textbooks are Functionalists.  
101 Id. at 232. 
102 Id. at 234. 
103 Id. at 232, 235; see also Morosini, supra note 162, at 546 (some scholars argue for a 
comparative methodology based on the differences in the laws of countries, the Non-Convergence 
Approach). 
104 Functionalists historically focus on European legal systems, arousing criticisms of 
Eurocentrism.  See Riles, supra note 158, at 232. 
105 Id. at 229. 
106 Id. at 240-41. See also Horst Klaus Lücke, Statutory Interpretation: New Comparative 
Dimensions, 54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1023, 1026  (reviewing Stefan Vogenauer, INTERPRETATION 
OF STATUTES IN ENGLAND AND ON THE CONTINENT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF JUDICIAL 
JURISPRUDENCE AND ITS HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS (2001)) (2005) (the author of the book 
attempts to explain the difference of interpretation of the law between different countries, 
particularly between English and continental courts. In his book, the author utilizes culture to 
explain the divergence in the method of interpretations between different countries). 
107 Riles, supra note 158, at 241. 
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language as well as deep cultural detail.108 Engaging different regions of the 
world than Functionalists, Context scholars reference highly detailed context to 
make adequate comparisons.109 
A third group, “Discourse scholars,” draw on critical theory’s interest in 
revealing hidden purposes or meanings.110 Literary theory and cultural studies 
provide insight into a legal text’s underlying meaning.111 Discourse scholars, in 
inquiring about their own legal traditions, address their subjectivity explicitly, in 
part to achieve some more accuracy in the description of the “other” legal 
system,112 in contrast to Functionalist work.113 Focusing on hidden meanings, 
Discourse comparativists depict the vagaries of translation, including its 
theoretical implications.114 
108 Id. at 242.  
109 Id. at 243.  Context scholars often reject the Eurocentric focus of Functionalists. Id. at 240.  
Context scholars concern themselves with the relationship between law and culture, law and 
society, the local meaning of legal institutions, and the character of a society’s legal reasoning. Id. 
110 Id. at 246-47. 
111 Riles, supra note 158, at 246-47. 
112 The concept of otherness, typically arising in critical theory with regard to group difference, 
also arises in the comparative law context.  See Morosini, supra note 162, at 547. 
113 Discourse scholars criticize Functionalist work for hiding their own subjectivity.  Ensuing 
description of other legal cultures may consist of the scholar’s projection of her own perceptions 
onto the ostensible territory of study.  In this “epistemological imperialism,” the study better 
reflects the values of the observer rather than the observed.  Teemu Ruskola, Legal Orientalism, 
101 MICH. L. REV. 179, 190 (2002). 
114 Many comparative scholars expressly deal with challenges of translation. See, e.g., Pierre 
Legrand, Derrida/America: The Present State of America’s Europe: Law: Paradoxically, Derrida: 
For a Comparative Legal Studies, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 631 (2005), citing KONRAD ZWEIGERT &
HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW (Tony Weir trans., 3d ed. 1998).  Kotz argues 
that comparative law can be many different things: logocentric (word-centered), nomocentric 
(law-centered), scientific, objective, functional, and/or apolitical.  Id. at 642. The idea of 
translation, which runs through much of  Derrida’s work.  See, e.g., Jacques Derrida, Des Tours de 
Babel, in DIFFERENCES IN TRANSLATION 179 (Joseph F. Graham ed. & trans. 1985) and JACQUES 
DERRIDA, POSITIONS 31 (1972). Derrida’s theory that the translator will decide the meaning of the 
words being translated suggests that comparative legal studies can best be understood with 
reference to a deconstructionist approach. See generally DERRIDA, supra note 179 (“Positions”).  
Within the context of comparative methodologies, translation is the loss of the original author: the 
writer-translator is the “’agent of survival…of works, not authors.’”  Jacques Derrida, Des Tours 
de Babel, in DIFFERENCES IN TRANSLATION 179 (Joseph F. Graham ed. & trans., 1985) (cited in 
Shireen Patell, Derrida/America: The Present State of America’s Europe: Culture: Untranslatable 
You, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 897, 900 (2005)).  The translator ensures “[p]erhaps the survival of 
authors’ names and of signatures, but not of authors.’”  Id. The “full presence” of the author is 
inevitably lost in the translation, in favor of a substituted presence of the translator. Id. Derrida 
argued that “For the notion of translation, one will have to substitute a notion of transformation: 
the regulated transformation of the language by another, of a text by another.”  DERRIDA, supra 
note 179, at 31 (“Positions”).  In other words, the translator is the person who decides what the 
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Behind these methods, comparative scholars deploy critical yet empathic 
thinking about difference,115 permitting fuller and more accurate understanding of 
internalization.   
 
2.   Comparative Challenges to Internalization  
 
Emphasizing difference over universality, comparative scholarship 
challenges understandings about internalization.  Comparative scholarship 
addresses domestic legal systems whose enforcement powers easily surpass that 
of international law.116 As discussed above, internalization can only occur with 
“local legitimation and support.”117 
Comparative scholarship raises several theoretical challenges for 
internalization.  Comparativist work, taken as a whole, highlights the astounding 
diversity among legal systems, revealing a world of vastly differing legal 
contexts.  Internalization necessarily would take distinct forms in these contexts.  
Koh’s compliance model, for example, appears deceptively simple in light of 
comparative work on the diversity of legal systems and cultures.  Internalization 
involves the interpretation of international norms, requiring a translation process 
in which the local actor interprets the application to her state.118 Drafters of 
international human rights law cannot presume that states will simply absorb 
international norms with no modification.  Comparative work reveal crucial legal 
cultural differences that would prevent local elaboration international human 
rights norms.  
Comparative scholarship points to the dynamic interaction between law, 
culture, and context.119 Individual countries’ legal systems cannot be reduced to 
an overarching unitary account or governing theory: within a state’s legal culture, 
competing explanations often arise, particularly in widely-studied states, from 
traditionally influential legal systems of France and Germany120 to the 
increasingly diverse literature on Chinese law.121 
original text means and decides which words he will use to convey that meaning, and will do so 
even though the original text is ultimately untranslatable.  Legrand, supra note 162, at 716.     
115 See Riles, supra note 158 at 222, 229, 282; see also the discussion in Riles, 250-54,  
116 L. Amede Obiora, Toward an Auspicious Reconciliation of International and Comparative 
Analyses, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 669, 676, 680 (1998). See also Rogers, supra note 1, at 156-57. 
117 Id. at 669.   
118 See, supra note 114. 
119 Symposium, Fiss’s Way: The Scholarship of Owen Fiss, I. Equality, Equality and the Forms of 
Justice, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 51, 63 (2004) [hereinafter Equality Symposium] 
120 See, e.g., William Ewald, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the German Constitution, 21 
CONST. COMMENT. 591 (2004) (book review); Mathias Reimann, Nineteenth Century German 
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Specific internalization theories that focus on particular institutions ignore 
the extent to which homologue institutions sharply differ from country to country.  
A comparativist perspective would reveal that each of these governmental 
organizations interpret laws according to its own structural processes that differ 
substantially.   Each institution in each state will bring a legal cultural history to 
norm elaboration that will necessarily color its iteration.   
Comparativists may also observe that laws ostensibly in pursuit of 
international norms may actually undermine those same norms, as will be 
discussed with regard to CEDAW.122 Overlooking context may lead international 
human rights advocates to presume benefits despite comparative evidence that 
salient differences may lead to dissonant local elaboration.  In a void of local 
knowledge, human rights criteria cannot recognize and respond to effects in real 
state contexts, leading to the potential misapplication of international norms.   
States with norms that parallel those of the international drafters may be 
inclined to interpret the norms in line with the drafters’ intentions.   But in states 
with markedly different legal traditions,123 however, the results of such 
interpretations may veer far from the original aims.  Here, the process of 
internalization itself may yield different results than drafters envisioned.  The 
changes to the norm that occur between international drafting and local 
 
Legal Science, 31 B.C.L. REV. 837 (1990); Mathias Reimann , Codifying Torts Conflicts: the 1999 
German Legislation in Comparative Perspective, 60 LA. L. REV. 1297 (2000).  
121 See, e.g., Jacques deLisle, China's Approach to International Law: A Historical Perspective, 94 
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 267 (2000); Benjamin L. Liebman, Legal Aid and Public Interest Law 
in China, 34 TEX. INT’L L. J. 211 (1999); Benjamin L. Liebman, Watchdog or Demagogue? The 
Media in the Chinese Legal System, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2005); Teemu Ruskola, Law Without 
Law, Or is “Chinese Law” an Oxymoron? 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 655 (2003). For 
example, some China scholars query whether it has a “rule of law,” asserting that Chinese law has 
been historically exclusively penal and lacked civil law, a significant component of the Western 
legal system, and conflates law with morality and custom.  See Teemu Ruskola, Legal 
Orientalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 179, 181-82 and 187 (2002). This civil law deficiency “signifies a 
gaping hole at the center of the Chinese legal system,” allowing some to allege that there is no 
“law” in China.  Id. at 182, 184  Teemu Ruskola questions this theory, arguing that it reflects a 
predisposition against Chinese law, one that presumes a Western Legalist’s definition of “law.”  
Id. at 204, 229, 233-34.  Unlike the Western legal system which is premised on the application of 
"rigid, universal, specific imperatives," China implements the disciplinary model – a legal system 
premised on "[o]bedience to superiors in a hierarchy of authority."  Id. at 661 (internal citations 
omitted). From the perspective of Western and non-legal Chinese scholars, Chinese “law” is “non-
law.” Ruskola, Legal Orientalism, supra note 41, at 234. This Chinese comparative example 
reflects a key value discourse comparativists raise – using an understanding of difference to 
understand one’s own legal system better. 
122 See infra Part IV. 
123 For an advanced analysis of the role of legal traditions in contemporary transnational law, see 
H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 1-31 (2004). 
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implementation might result in effects entirely antithetical to the original purpose.  
Internalization depends on the local interpretation of the global norm, rendering 
compliance with international human rights norms difficult to measure. 
 This diversity itself calls into question the keystone universality behind 
international law and relations.  International human rights advocates may fear 
that the comparativist attention to context might derail their project into a 
relativist mire.  International law scholars – who have long ignored the value of 
comparative work in developing international norms - may conflate such 
comparative work with a cultural relativism that incapacitates international law. 
Comparative methodologies may not always reveal understandings that support 
international regimes - the risk arises that some states may reference cultural 
difference as an excuse to avoid conformity to human rights norms.124 However 
potent these challenges to international law and internalization theory may be, 
comparative methodologies also may contribute to the effective elaboration and 
implementation of international law.  
 
C. Inserting the “National” into Internalization 
 
Comparative methods pose three potential advantages to internalization.  
First, comparativists may examine international law as if it were another state law, 
comparing and contrasting its provisions with those of certain countries’ legal 
systems. One example is Annelise Riles’ close anthropological study of United 
Nations efforts on women’s issues in part applies a comparative analysis using 
international law as the text.125 This area of scholarship reveals underlying 
structures, behaviors, and motives of international institutions.126 A cultural lens 
exposes limits to internalization posed by presumed legal universals.127 
124 Obiora, supra note 183, at 678.  Leti Volpp’s fascinating work on considering cultural 
difference provides considerable support for deeper thinking about these issues.  See, e.g., Leti 
Volpp, On Culture, Difference, and Domestic Violence, 11 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 393 
(2003). 
125 ANNELISE RILES, THE NETWORK INSIDE OUT 29 (2001). 
126 Id.  
127 Discourse comparativists in particular have questioned international human rights law as 
relying on colonialist tools and language,implements that undermine the human rights norms 
themselves.  Riles, supra note 125, at 228. See also  Comparative Legal Studies, supra note x, at 
1044-45 (Part one, second division, of the book discusses “the colonialist heritage according to 
which comparative law was used to transform the law of the colonizer into colonial law (positivist 
genre), to mark a transition of non-modern law to modern law in the former colonies 
(instrumentalist genre), to analyze the differences between the societal structures of the legal 
systems of the colonized and the colonist (sociological genre), and to identify the reasons why 
certain legal-ideological traditions spread more than others”). 
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Second, comparative law may enrich internalization analyses on a non-
normative level to better define and enforce human rights.128 Given divergent 
legal cultures, internalization may be achieved in a more effective fashion.  
Comparativists may provide “useful” ways to surmount challenges of 
internalization of human rights norms.  “Local legitimation and support” are 
necessary to secure individual state compliance with international human rights 
norms.129 Leslye Obiora argues that most of this legitimation comes from the 
“mutual respect and understanding” between states.130 Looking at different 
cultures and values could help shape global ideals, developing wider agreement 
over international regimes and assisting in their legitimization.131 To reconcile 
these different interests, common threads throughout these cultures need to be 
found. 
Third, comparative knowledge may serve not only to inform but to 
challenge and refine normative goals of international law, blurring the line 
between the technical and the normative.  Inequality, whether fostered by the 
internalization of law or commerce, may surface through interactive patterns that 
produce thorny relationships within domestic legal cultures.  A comparative 
problem-identifying process itself may expose the limits of liberal paradigms and 
international norms, norms built on detached logical consideration that may fly 
over the details of state differences.  Comparative work may help collapse the 
dichotomy between the universalism that defines the international project and the 
difference revealed by comparative work,132 allowing a broader reconsideration of 
international human rights norms.  
Awareness of context is imperative.  Borrowing from Susan Sturm’s 
epistemological efforts in the United States equality jurisprudence context,133 
reflective and inclusive consideration may give rise to a more “situated 
knowledge,” knowledge needed not only to understand the normative component 
of legal problems but also to formulate internalization methods that remedy real 
problems.  Norm internalization affects states as well as groups within states, with 
impacts that vary spatially or even temporally.  International law, using 
comparative methodologies, may conceptualize alternatives to minimize such 
exclusionary or otherwise harmful impacts on states or groups within states.  
 
128 Obiora, supra note 183, at 669.   
129 Id.
130 Id. at 670. 
131 Id. at 678-79. 
132 For a discussion of the tension between universality and difference in the gender context, see 
Darren Rosenblum, Parity/Disparity: Electoral Gender Inequality on the Tightrope of Liberal 
Constitutional Traditions, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1119 (2006). 
133 Equality Symposium, supra note 119, at 63-64. 
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Within liberal constitutional systems, scholars have inquired how to 
identify, define, and remedy group based inequality.134 Likewise, in the 
internalization of international human rights law, examining inequalities among 
states and groups may clarify the meaning of these norms in particular contexts.  
Comparative methodologies may thus concretely contribute greater 
internalization.  It must be noted that this comparative contribution goes beyond 
added information, centering on methodological concerns of understanding 
difference.135 Riles asserts that international law fails not due to a lack of 
information but due to a “lack of interest, empathy, or faith in the possibility of 
engagement with difference than because of a lack of information about things 
foreign.”136 Comparativists should focus on their potential to illuminate 
differences across cultures and within cultures.137 
In sum, comparative scholarship fosters deeper and perhaps more 
effective understandings of internalization.  Since internalization takes place in 
the context of different legal cultures, international theories of internalization 
cannot explain internalization without comparative perspectives.  Comparative 
scholarship should aid internationalists in distinguishing among competing 
understandings of difference, establishing when such differences should effect a 
rethinking of internalization processes, even of norms themselves. 
Internalizing international norms of gender equality faces still greater 
challenges than other human rights norms due to the culturally dependent nature 
of gender.  To prove this point, the following Part’s examination of the 
internalization of CEDAW’s norms for women’s political equality in Brazil and 
France.  This example will demonstrate both the complexity of internalization and 
the potential utility of comparative understandings.  
III. Contextualizing Internalization: French and Brazilian Legislation of 
Women’s Political Representation  
As discussed above, state internalization of CEDAW’s norms crystallizes 
the relationship between international law and national realities.  Studying a 
state’s response to these norms  requires a comparative lens.  Here, the 
complicated nature of this relationship between international norms and domestic 
 
134 Id. , at 73-74.  
135 Dramatizing this point, Annelise Riles points to the limited utility of data without analysis: 
“[t]he last thing we need from comparativists, or from librarians or global law firms,” she states, 
“is another web page, hyperlink, or database.” Riles, supra note 158, at 281. This modernist rush 
toward increasing data does not fulfill the promise of comparative methodology. Id. 
136 Id. at 282. 
137 Id. at 282-83. 
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realities surface.  This Part focuses on two countries’ internalization of one 
section of one human rights treaty, in contrast to Hathaway’s broad analysis of 
human rights norm adoption by all treaty signatories and non-signatories.  This 
Part will concentrate on two CEDAW signatories, Brazil and France, and how 
each of those countries have adopted quotas for women’s political representation. 
Despite CEDAW’s status as a soft law, it nonetheless has affected the 
development of gender equality norms in Brazil and France.  Examining the 
adoption of such quotas provides an effective way to understand internalization.   
This Part proceeds first by outlining how quotas for women’s 
representation in France and Brazil illustrate the impact of international legal 
instruments in different state contexts.  Although CEDAW is in some ways the 
paradigmatic soft law, it has influenced developments in these two countries, 
reflecting the complex relationship between international and domestic law.  
Here, the emphasis will be on Brazil’s efforts, as other scholarship has already 
described France’s Parity law in adequate detail.138 
Second, the cultural contingency of gender provides a key comparative 
lesson for international women’s rights law, and consequently for the 
internalization of international human rights law.  The construction of gender in 
France and Brazil differs, leading to disparate results with their “quota” laws. 
 
A.   Internalizing Quotas for Women’s Representation 
 
Brazil and France compare and contrast in the text of the laws adopted as 
well as in the underlying legal cultures and constructions of gender.  Certain 
commonalities exist between these otherwise disparate countries: both legal 
systems draw on the Civil Code, the primary religion in both countries is Roman 
Catholicism, and their languages both descend from Latin.  Examining Brazil’s 
Quota Law and France’s Parity Law reveal markedly different approaches to the 
relationship between group rights and democracy as well as the relationship 
between gender and democracy.   These differences draw, at least in part, on the 
construction of gender in each country. 
Over the past two decades, largely through CEDAW and the international 
women’s rights movement, attention has moved toward increasing women’s 
political power through quota laws.  As discussed earlier in this Part, the adoption 
of provisions to promote women’s political equality in Brazil and France directly 
draw on international laws and efforts.  In particular, CEDAW’s Article Seven 
envisioned political participation as a key right for women.  The Fourth World 
Conference on Women, held in Beijing in 1995, united women’s rights activists 
 
138 See, Rosenblum, supra note 132.  
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from around the world.  Empowering women in political systems was one of the 
key goals of the conference.  Specific calls for quotas to increase women’s 
representation drew widespread support, and played a significant role in inspiring 
activists from France and Brazil.  
The Platform states that governments should “[t]ake measures, including, 
where appropriate, in electoral systems that encourage political parties to integrate 
women in elective and non-elective public positions in the same proportion and at 
the same levels as men.”139 Attended by activists and governmental 
representatives from around the world, the Beijing Conference brought together 
state actors, international actors, and transnational and local activists.   Working 
together on envisioning the realization of the Platform led to substantial change 
on the issue of women’s political representation.140 Brazilian women’s rights 
activists referenced the conference in the debate over the Quota Law.  For 
example, Representative Marisa Serrano stated that at Beijing, the connection was 
made between constitutional precepts and equality between men and women, 
including political power.141 Similarly, French activists explicitly connected 
international developments to French goals for equality.142 
This movement provides examples of the limitations of internalizing 
international law, and the extent to which comparative knowledge and 
methodologies may illuminate such international legal moves.   Brazil and France 
provide strong comparisons as two democracies which, following international 
efforts, have adopted different systems with differing goals. 
Before analyzing the theoretical relevance of these laws, this section will 
describe compliance with CEDAW, and then the internalization response - the 
movement toward the Quota Law and the Parity Law - their passage, provisions 
and shortcomings.  The interactive elaboration of laws for women’s 
representation reflects the involvement of local activists with international efforts 
and the response of state institutions to international reporting requirements. 
 
1. Brazil’s Internalization of CEDAW Article 7 
 
a. Initial Compliance with CEDAW 
139 The United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women Platform for Action, available at 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/platform/decision.htm (last visited July 24, 2006). 
140 Get Support from Quotaproject.org site. 
141 Marisa Serrano, Speech, Record of the National Congress; Brasilia; Nov. 7, 1996, at 29065 (?), 
cited in Miguel, supra note 4; at 47. 
142 FIND CITE – GASPARD on CEDAW? 
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Article Seven requires signatories eliminate “discrimination against 
women in the political and public life of the country,” especially with respect to 
public office.143 Although a direct causal link between Brazil’s adoption of 
remedies to electoral gender inequality and CEDAW would be difficult to prove, 
the interaction between domestic activists and international institutions points to 
CEDAW’s impact.  Brazil ratified CEDAW in February 1984 with few 
reservations.144 Brazil never made reservations to Article Seven,145 and withdrew 
all of its reservations with the exception of its reservation to article 29.1.146 In the 
early 1990s, Brazilian feminists drew on the international women’s rights 
movement to criticize Brazil's ten percent women's representation in 
government.147 To increase “the presence of women in political institutions and 
party leadership,”148 activists built on ties to the left opposition to the 
 
143 “Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under article 18 of the Convention on the 
Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women: combined initial, second, third, 
fourth, and fifth periodic reports of States parties- Brazil,”105 (November 2002), available at 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NO2/687/25/PDF/NO268725.pdf?OpenElement (last 
visited, July 14, 2006) (hereinafter “Consideration of reports”).   
144 “CEDAW: State Parties,” available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/states.htm
(last visited, July 14, 2006). 
145 Brazil asserted reservations to articles 15.4; 16.1(a), (c), (g), (h); and 29.1 of the Convention. 
See CEDAW, Declarations, Reservations, and Objections to CEDAW, available at 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations-country.htm. (last visited July 3, 2006).   
146 Id.  Article 29.1 relates to the method of dispute resolution.  Under 29.1, disputes between two 
state parties which cannot be settled by negotiation will be submitted to arbitration upon request.  
If the state parties cannot agree on the structure of the arbitration proceedings within six months, 
the dispute will be referred to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) upon the request of either 
party.  Id.
147 Brazil is a federal republic headed by a president and composed of 26 states with one federal 
district.  There is a bicameral legislature, divided into the Federal Senate (Upper House) and a 
Lower Chamber. Senators serve an eight-year term; all other elected officials serve for four years.  
With the exception of the Senate, legislative representation is proportional with each state having a 
minimum of eight and a maximum of 70 representatives. There are two further levels of legislative 
representation in addition to the federal legislature—legislative assemblies (state level) and city 
councils (municipal level).  There are thirty official political parties, eight of which are medium to 
mid sized. See Clara Araújo, Quotas for Women in the Brazilian Legislative System, at 
http://www.quotaproject.org/CS/CS_Araujo_Brazil_25-11-2003.pdf. 
148 Id. Women in Brazil first gained the right to vote in 1932, 51 years after the proclomation of 
the republic. This is a fact often cited as contributing factor in the limited scale of female 
representation. However, when compared to Europe and the West, percentage of female 
representation and participation in Brazil was on par, if not above. Initial quota movements began 
in the 1980s, and were first adopted by two left of center parties, the Labor Democratic Party 
(PDT) and the Worker’s Party (PT). Other left parties also accepted the idea with quotas varying 
from 20% to 30%.  See id. 
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dictatorship.149 Their first success arrived in convincing the largest union, Central 
Unica dos Trabalhadores (CUT) to adopt a provision for 30% quotas for women 
in its leadership, a quota followed by other political parties.  Only one Brazilian 
state, the relatively progressive Rio Grande do Sul, had a quota law prior to 
1995,150 and it remains the only state, as of 2002, that enforces minimum and 
maximum quotas for each gender in the state administration.151 In 1991, Brazil 
had its first female senator, and in 1994 its first female governor.  Prior to the first 
quota law in October 1995, Brazil had not “adopt[ed] concrete measures to 
expand women’s opportunities for political participation” in compliance with 
Article Seven.152 
b. Passage of the Quota Law 
 
Martha Suplicy,153 a member of the National Assembly, promoted national 
adoption of such rules,154 despite activist sentiment that the proposal's 
“effectiveness and nature … [was] viewed with caution.”155 Some concern arose 
in the debate as to whether the law violated the constitutional provision against 
 
149 This statement is confirmed by the fact that the “left” parties had the largest number of women 
elected.  For example, the Workers Party (PT), had 58 women elected to the Federal Chamber in 
2002.  Women made up 13.9% of the PT’s candidates.  An even larger number, 29—or 19.7% of 
candidates, were elected to the state assembly.   
150 “Consideration of reports,” supra note 139, at 107.  That law established minimum and 
maximum percentages (30% and 70%) for men and women in state administrative bodies.  See 
generally “Consideration of reports,” supra note 139.  Similarly, Brazil has not acted to honor its 
commitment under Article 8 of CEDAW.  Article 8 states that State Parties “shall take all 
appropriate measures to ensure to women…the opportunity to represent their Governments at the 
international level.”  Id. at 118.  As of 2002, only 18.2% of Brazil’s international representation 
was female.  Until 1954, women were not allowed in the diplomatic corps.  When CEDAW was 
ratified by Brazil in 1984, there were no Brazilian female ambassadors.  Id. While “[t]oday, there 
are no gender discriminating rules in the Diplomatic Career,” most women only reach intermediate 
level positions.  Id. at 119.   
151 “Consideration of reports,” supra note 139, at 107.  The report notes that at the time 
(November 2002) a bill was also pending in the state of Paraiba that would establish the same 
minimum and maximum quotas for managerial positions in the state administration.  Id.
152 “Consideration of reports, “ supra note 139, at 105.  The report points out, however, that the 
Brazilian Constitution provides no “normative obstacle” that would prevent women’s equal access 
to elective office.  Id.
153 Martha Suplicy was a member of the federal chamber in the PT party, when the quota law was 
proposed and is a former mayor of Sao Paulo.  Suplicy, an important feminist leader, won the 
mayoralty of Sao Paulo in 2002.  The lead proponent of the Lei das Cotas entered the political 
arena in the late 1980s as a sex expert, shocking the conservatives in Brazil, since she spoke 
everyday in the morning about sex and orgasm for a feminine audience. 
154 Id.   
155 Id. 
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sex discrimination because it favored women over men.  The constitutionality of 
these provisions, it was concluded, rests on the recognition of substantial 
workplace inequalities faced by women.156 
Prior to 1995, the Brazilian federal legislature had not adopted any 
“concrete” measures that would allow for increased participation for women in 
the political arena.157 Law 9,100, passed in October 1995, established a minimum 
quota of 20% women’s candidacy for the municipal elections of October 1996.158 
In 1997, Law 9,5045 established a minimum (30%) and maximum (70%) quota 
for candidates of either sex beginning in 2000.159 By 1998, the mandatory quotas 
as they appear today, requiring a minimum of 30% representation for each sex, 
were applied to federal and regional elections.160 The legislation permitted parties 
to increase the numbers of candidates, watering down the effect of the quota.161 
c. Assessing the Quota Law 
 
Two measures surface to assess the Quota Law: 1) whether the required 
number of female candidates were presented to the voters, and 2) how many of 
those candidates actually won elected office. Brazil’s Quota Law has not 
advanced women’s representation as rapidly as some may have hoped.162 
156 See, e.g., Congresso, Senado Federal, PARECER DE PROPOSTA DE EMENDA À CONSTITUIÇAO N°
7 (1999). 
157 “Consideration of reports,” supra note 139, at 105. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. Transitional measures established that for the 1998 municipal elections, the minimum and 
maximum quotas would be 25% and 75%, respectively.  Id. By November 2002, there were 18 
legislative bells pending in the Brazilian National Congress relating in some way to quotas or 
increasing women’s representation.  Id. at 108.   
160 See id. 
161 See id. “[T]he number of seats to be filled in each party’s list was increased from 120 percent to 
a maximum of 150 percent of the disputed seats.” Id. Part of the complexity of the Quota Law 
provision lies in the nature of the Brazilian electoral process.  This process requires the voter place 
a vote for the candidate and for the electoral coefficient.  Thus, a candidate will only win if the 
party to which he or she belongs wins a sufficient electoral coefficient.  A candidate therefore 
could receive enough votes to be elected but if his/her party fails to obtain the electoral coefficient, 
the candidate will lose.  This system contrasts with traditional proportional system, such as list 
voting in which electoral success depends directly and solely along party-line votes. See Malheiros 
Miguel, supra note 4, at 23. 
162 A similar trend is present when analyzing women candidates for state and federal elections—
thus far, none of the political parties have met the quota minimum of 30% women representatives.  
As with the city council elections, smaller political parties tend to have a higher percentage of 
candidates that are women.  The overall number (and percentage) of women representation in 
assemblies has, however, increased. Id. The number of women candidates to State assemblies has 
quadrupled over a period of eight years. However, the number of women actually elected rose by a 
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Women’s representation in Brazil has increased since the passage of the quota 
law,163 but not as much as had been hoped.  
In 2000, the Brazilian government presented its national report on the 
implementation in Brazil of the Beijing Platform for Action 1995.164 In that 
report, the Brazilian government noted that it has adopted legislation establishing 
quotas for women candidates,165 but that “the implementation of the quota policy 
based on the gender of the candidate has not yet achieved the expected results 
because the women candidates do not receive effective and adequate support, the 
parties do not comply with the quotas and the parties do not affirmatively direct 
resources toward the women candidate.”166 Further, the response indicated that 
the Brazilian government was reviewing new proposals aimed at making the 
legislation more effective.167 
In its report pursuant to CEDAW Article 18, the Brazilian government 
asserted that it has adopted legislation that called for an increase in the 
participation of women at decision-making levels in the political arena. 168 The 
government has also adopted various policies to increase the participation of 
women in positions of power.169 The report indicates that since its last report, the 
number of female ministers in Brazil has decreased.170 Hopes ran high that the 
2002 election would show improvement, due to the strength of the candidacy of 
 
little more than 50%.  Since 1994, the number of women candidates to the Federal Chamber has 
been consistently rising. See A Surpresa Feminina Nas Urnas, supra note 200. 
163 See id. 
164 See Brazilian National Report on the Implementation in Brazil of Platform for Action of the 4th 
World Conference on Women (2000), available at 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/followup/responses/Brazil.pdf (last visited July 3, 2006).   
165 Id. at 42. 
166 Id. at 44. 
167 Id. at 44-45.  The response mentions the active identification of women within the Executive 
branch who could assume high-power positions, giving financial support to governmental bodies 
to propose and fund gender policies, create or strengthen political recruiting programs, assign a 
specific portion of election funds to finance women candidates, and the creation of political 
training programs for women within political parties.    
168 See Convention on the Elimination on All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Committee 
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Country Reports, Consideration of Reports 
Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, Sixth Periodic Report of States Parties: Brazil, available at 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/479/31/PDF/N0547931.pdf?OpenElement, (last 
visited July 3, 2006).   
169 Id.  For example, the report states that there are bills under debate in the National Congress that 
would modify the current quota law by increasing the percentage, sanctioning parties that do not 
comply with the minimum quota, and establishing quotas in other political arenas. Id. at 42.  
170 Id. at 40-41.
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Luis Inacio Lula da Silva, but the results disappointed.171 It shows a small 
increase in women’s representation in the National Congress as a result of the 
2002 elections.172 The 2004 municipal elections saw a large increase in 
percentage terms, but still fell far below ten percent.173 Since 1996, 
municipalities have logged only a small increase in the number of women 
candidates since 1996.174 The 2005 report concluded that Law No. 9.504, which 
establishes a quota system for women representation, is insufficient: it requires 
sanctions and other mechanisms to ensure compliance with the law.175 
Comparing Brazil with France reveals interesting lessons about the role of 
women in politics and the strategies pursued to achieve a more just level of 
representation. 
 
171 As Teresa Cruvinel stated in O Globo, “this time everything indicated that the quota policy 
would not be put aside as useless to strengthen women’s presence in political representation 
again.” Teresa Cruvinel, Retratos de um Novo Brasil, O Globo, Oct. 8, 2002.  Despite this hope, 
no party met the 30% requirement for women candidates. One commentator stated that 
“[h]istorically, women have always been ignored in the system of power.  Today, however, there 
exists much more room that may be characterized as feminine participation.  It falls to us to use 
this moment to promote this transformation of gender in politics.” Leticia Helena, Eleições Brasil, 
O Globo, Oct. 10, 2002 (quoting Betania).  The results of the 2002 elections demonstrate that the 
Quota Law resulted in an increase in the number of women running for the elections, but the 
number of women actually elected is still small.  Nevertheless, it should be noted that the 2002 
elections show an increase in women’s participation when we see that there was a female 
candidate for the presidency of the republic, five candidates for state governments (two women 
won). 
172 The increase was a 20% increase. A Surpresa Feminina Nas Urnas, O Globo, Oct. 13, 2002.  
173 In 2004, 407 women elected to the office of mayor (7.32%), compared with the 2000 elections 
when 317 women were elected (5.70%).Id. at 41. 
174 In 1996, 17.6% of candidates in municipal elections were women.  This number increased to 
19.2% in the 2000 elections.  It is, however, important to note that none of the 30 political parties 
were able to meet the minimum 30% quota; those that came closest were small in size. For 
example, the Unified Workers Socialist Party (PSTU), an extreme left-wing party without 
representation in Congress presented 22.2% female candidates. The National Order 
Reconstruction Party (PRONA), a small right-wing party, presented 22.19% female candidates. 
See id. In 1998, however, with the exception of one state’s party list, no other roster of candidates 
included 25% women in 1998.  Although no party made the quota, given the extensive efforts in 
1998 to further the representation of women, progress had been expected. Women’s representation 
actually decreased in 1998 from the previous period by nearly ten percent, as only 5.65% of the 
representatives in the federal chamber were women. Malheiros Miguel, supra note 4, at 131. One 
party superceded the quota – the Communist Party of Brazil  --  it had women as 40% of its 
candidates.  Other parties on the left generally came closer to the quota requirement, including the 
Partido dos Trabalhadores (“PT”). Malheiros Miguel, supra note 4, at 132. Subsequent to the 1998 
elections, critics called the Quota Law “timid, to say the least.” Miguel, supra note 9, at 92. 
175 Id. The report states that the fact of a quota “is not enough in of itself to ensure greater 
participation by women in the political parties and, consequently, in political positions.”  Id. “The 
Law must include provisions that establish sanctions, and other effective mechanisms.” Id.   
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2. France’s Internalization of CEDAW Article 7 
France ratified CEDAW in December 1983.176 France initially placed 
several reservations on CEDAW, including a reservation to Article 7 that related 
to the vote of naturalized citizens.177 France subsequently withdrew that 
reservation along with most others.178 Like Brazil, France took little action to 
fulfill its responsibilities under Article 7 of CEDAW until passage of the Parity 
law in 2000.179 Although termed a “government priority,” women’s participation 
in domestic politics increased only marginally over the period from France’s 
ratification of CEDAW until 2000, when it passed the Parity Law.180 Prior to 
Parity’s passage, some of the political parties on the left voluntarily adopted 
provisions to increase women’s representation, leading to some increase in the 
level of women’s representation.181 Parity’s passage required a constitutional 
 
176 “CEDAW: State Parties,” supra note 1.   
177 France also made several reservations and declarations to the Convention, notably with respect 
to articles 5(b); 7; 14.2(c), (h); 15.2; 15.3; 16.1(c), (d), (g), (h); and 29(1), but by April 2006 had 
withdrawn all of these reservations with the exception of those to articles 14.2(c), (h); 16.1(g), and 
29.1.  Id.  With regard to Article 7, France’s concern was that under currently existing French 
law, persons who were not French citizens by birth but later obtained French citizenship were 
temporarily disqualified from holding national office.  France withdrew the reservation in 1984 
after eliminating that provision.  See 
http://sim.law.uu.nl/SIM/Library/RATIF.nsf/be2c697381d495be41256bfb00349
3b1/e1479bf2db7724f5c12568b900447f47?OpenDocument (last visited July 13, 2006). Article 
14.2 declares that state parties will take appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against 
women in rural areas and will work to ensure specific enumerated rights.  14.2(c) involves the 
right to benefit directly from social security programs and 14.2(h) the right to enjoy adequate 
living conditions (especially with respect to housing, electricity and water supply, transportation, 
and sanitation).  Article 16.1 declares that state parties will take appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination against women in the area of marriage and family.  16.1(g) relates to the equal right 
of a woman to choose a family name, occupation, and a profession.  Id.
178 Id. 
179 See, Rosenblum, supra note 132; JOAN WALLACH SCOTT, PARITÉ!: SEXUAL EQUALITY AND 
THE CRISIS OF FRENCH UNIVERSALISM (2005). 
180 See “Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under article 18 of the Convention on 
the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women: third periodic report- France,” 16 
(October 1999), available at 
http://www.daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NO0/221/04/PDF/NO022104.pdf?OpenElemen
t (last visited, July 14, 2006) (hereinafter “France third report”). 
181 Id., at 16. Although women had made “striking progress” in the judiciary (47.5% of staff in 
1996 as opposed to 40.5% in 1989), it is unclear whether this is due to any governmental action.  
Id., at 17. However, a proposal was submitted to the Minister for Civil Service in 1999 which 
suggested strategies for overcoming the disparity in that organization (although women accounted 
for 56.9% of the staff, they occupied barely 6% of the highest administrative posts).  Id. at 19.   
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amendment process necessary to enact a quota law.182 Like Brazil, France also 
has made few efforts to fulfill its responsibilities under Article 8 of CEDAW.183 
To comply with the Convention, France agreed to submit a response to the 
Questionnaire on the Application of the Beijing Platform for Action 1995.184 
France had to amend its constitution as a result of a 1982 ruling by the 
Constitutional Council in France that the quotas were unconstitutional,185 a 
decision in response to a proposed bill that would have established a 25% 
minimum and a 75% maximum quota for both sexes in municipal elections.186 
Only after the French Constitution was amended in 1999, that the first quota 
legislation, Parity, could be enacted in 2000.187 Under Parity, all elections with a 
proportional ballot (for example, municipal elections in large towns, senatorial 
and regional elections, and European Parliament elections) required an equal (50-
50%) proportion of male and female candidates.188 Like Brazil, France has 
established legal sanctions for non-compliance.189 
In 2000, France approved its Parity Law, amending the Constitution of the 
Fifth Republic of 1958 providing for laws to implement Parity,190 writing into its 
 
182 Id., at 20-21.  In 1982, the Constitutional Council had held that a law seeking to establish 
quotas based on sex for municipal elections was unconstitutional.  In order for Parity to pass, the 
French constitution had to first be amended.      
183 Id., at 21-22.  The level of participation among French women in international organizations is 
“extremely low.”  In 1999, only 6.7% of ambassadors and resident representatives were women.  
While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs “encourages women to apply for posts in international 
organizations,” their representation there remains small. Id. at 22.  
184 See France’s Response to the Questionnaire on Implementation of the Beijing Platform for 
Action (1995) and the Outcome Documents of the 23rd Special Session of the General Assembly 
(“Beijing + 5”), 1.  http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/followup/countrylist.htm
185 France Third Report, supra note 176.  Quotas were “contrary to the constitutional principles of 
equality and universality, which ‘…oppose any division into categories of electors or those 
standing for election…’” Id. (quoting Constitutional Council report 82146 of November 1982).  
186 “France Third Report,” supra note 176, at 20. 
187 Quota Database, available at 
http://www.quotaproject.org/displayCountry.cfm?CountryCode=FR (last visited July 16, 2006) 
(hereinafter “Quota Database- France”).  The Constitution was amended to state "the law favors 
the equal access of women and men to electoral mandates and elective functions," as well as 
stating that it was the responsibility of political parties to facilitate equal access. The amendment 
has been referred to as ‘'the parity reform.”  Id.
188 Id. In addition, the overall split between male and female candidates from each party in 
legislative elections at the national level also had to be 50-50%.  Id.
189 Id. These penalties are largely financial: public funding from the state is reduced once the 
deviation from parity with respect to candidates reaches 2%.  Id.
190 Number 99-569 of July 8, 1999 states: 
Article 1 –Article 3 of the Constitution of October 4, 1958 is completed by a paragraph as follows: 
"The law favors the equal access of women and men to elected office and elected functions." 
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Constitution the principle of equal access for women and men to elected mandates 
and elective functions.191 Parity required that 50% of the candidates be female.192 
Article 3 of France’s Constitution provided that the law must promote equal 
access.  Article 4 mandated that political parties and groups facilitate 
implementation of this principle,193 in part by imposing a financial penalty on 
parties and political groups that fail to come within 2% of the 50% gender balance 
rule.194 The legislation was applied for the first time during the municipal 
elections of 2001.195 During that election the proportion of woman town 
councilors were almost doubled – in 2001 women represented 47.5% of town 
councilors compared with 25% from previous municipal elections.196 In 
September 2001, there were 35 females in the Senate (10.9%), compared with 
5.9% in 1998.  However, the number of women elected as mayors remained very 
low.197 Although the new law imposes financial penalties, larger political parties 
have tended to shoulder that cost rather than meet the requirements of the law 
fully, so that overall only 38% of the candidates were women.198 In sum, 
France’s Report admits that, “overall, these outcomes still fall short of the 
democratic parity ideal, and further measures are needed, to improve women’s 
representation in all elected bodies, whatever the election mode, and in elective 
functions.”199 
3. Comparing the Quota Law to Parity 
 
Article 2 – Article 4 of the Constitution of October 4, 1958 is completed by a paragraph as 
follows: "They will contribute to the execution of the principal enunciated in the last paragraph of 
Article 3 of the Constitution under conditions determined by the law.”  
191 Id. at 12. 
192 Id.  
193 See Convention on the Elimination on All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Committee 
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Country Reports, Consideration of Reports 
Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, Fifth Periodic Reports of States Parties: France, 30, available at 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/610/76/PDF/N0261076.pdf?OpenElement (last 
visited July 3, 2006). 
194 Id. at 30-31. 
195 Id. at  31. 
196 Id.  
197 Id.  
198 See France’s Response to the Questionnaire on Implementation of the Beijing Platform for 
Action (1995) and the Outcome Documents of the 23rd Special Session of the General Assembly 
(“Beijing + 5”), 13. 
199 Id. at 13. 
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Although a far more extensive comparison could be drawn between the 
Parity and the Quota Law, this discussion will focus on two elements: the 
differing underlying efficacy of the laws and contrasting visions of gender in the 
debate over the laws. 
Both governments of Brazil and France have been exceptionally active in 
attempting to increase women’s representation in the political arena.  While both 
countries experienced some success with their new parity legislation, neither 
country was satisfied with the outcomes of their legislations.  The Brazilian 
government deems sanctions necessary for effective legislation, in part because 
the Quota Law lacks such mechanisms.   France, on the other hand, has such 
mechanisms, but understands the limits of such methods given the results in 
France.   France claims to be exploring new ways to increase women’s political 
representation. 
 France’s Parity Law imposes a percent (50%) requirement with two 
kinds of enforcement, which vary depending on the election in question.  In 
France, list-based elections determine municipal, regional, European, and certain 
senatorial elections.  For these elections, the enforcement mechanism of Parity is 
of the highest level: should a party fail to present candidates of alternating gender, 
its list would not be registered by the Prefecture and as a consequence it would 
not appear on the ballot.   Thus, a political party must name women to half its 
proposed candidates, or lose the ability to run any candidates.200 For uninominal 
elections, such as an executive post, the candidates presented by a party have as 
many women as men overall.  Here, a party failing to meet to 50% rule will lose 
an equivalent percentage of state funding.201 
In the two elections conducted in the five years since Parity’s passage, 
some areas have shown sharp improvements in women's representation while 
other elections led to smaller increases.  Unsurprisingly, given the distinction 
between the enforcement measures for different elections, political parties met the 
challenge of the Parity Law where they risked losing all possibility of election.  
Where parties risked only a loss in state financial support, they seem to have 
made a markedly smaller effort to achieve parity.202 
200 May 2000 La Gazette de l'AFEM (Association des Femmes de l'Europe 
Meridionale)(Association of Women of Southern Europe) 3.  Elections by list where three or 
fewer candidates appear also avoid the parity rules. Legifrance cite.   
201 May 2000 La Gazette de L'AFEM 3.  There is no parity provision for elections in localities 
under 3500 inhabitants. 
202 The French Senate, for example, has 320 members, each elected for 9-year terms.  
Approximately one-third of the Senate faces the voters every three years, in an irregular 
combination of list-ballots and direct election.  The senatorial elections of September, 2001 had 
102 senatorial positions up for election, of which 74 were by list ballot.  Among the positions up 
for election, the number of women increased by more than three-fold, from 7 to 22, or in 
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France’s Parity Law has overall showed greater efficacy203 than the Quota 
Law, leading critics such as Luis Felipe Miguel to call it “timid.”  Enforcement is 
the key difference - the Quota Law mandates thirty percent but does not punish 
failure to meet that level.  Although there are legal sanctions for political parties 
that do not comply (where the minimum percentages are not met, candidates of 
the sex which is over-represented can be removed- but not replaced- by 
candidates of the under-represented sex), the sanctions only apply where the 
political party has submitted candidates equal to the maximum number which can 
be submitted.204 In addition, by expanding the total number of candidates, the 
Quota Law allowed the parties to avoid the difficult decision of which men not to 
nominate so that women candidates could be accommodated, making the women 
they select still less likely to succeed. 
The differences in implementation of these quotas draw, at least in part, on 
the variation in the construction of gender in these two different countries.   
B. Gender Differentials 
 
Although sex, which refers to biological difference, does not vary much 
from country to country, gender does.  Gender depends on culture, and gender’s 
 
percentage terms, from 6.9% to 21.5%.  However, by virtue of the fact that only approximately 
one-third of the Senate's seats faced election, the number of women increased from 20 to 35, or 
from 6.25% to 10.9%. Thus, owing to the Parity Law, women crossed the ten-percent threshold in 
the Senate. Of the sixty Senators elected for the first time, 18, or 30%, were women, a remarkable 
improvement. August-October 2001 La Gazette de L'AFEM 4-5. A far greater success for Parity 
arrived in the municipal elections of March 2001, women's presence among the elected went from 
21.7% to 47.5%. Thus, women have obtained near-parity in most municipal elected positions. 
Many women won positions as mayor of their locality, and interestingly, women in municipalities 
governed by the conservative parties showed the most marked improvement.  In the 42 largest 
cities, 49.5% of those elected in 2001 are women.  Indeed, in Paris, which has the nation's first 
openly gay mayor, Bertrand Delanoe, 18 of the 33 members of the cabinet are women. Feb-March 
2001 La Gazette de L'AFEM 2-3. In the 2002 elections, the number of elected women for the 
National Assembly went from 59 in 1997 to 71, a small increase in the five years since 1997. 
Although 38.5% of the candidates were women in the first round, only 23.9% of the candidates in 
the second round were women, demonstrating that the parties had placed women, usually 
newcomers, against opponents who were likely to win. May-June 2002 La Gazette de L'AFEM 3-
4. 
203 Id. 
204 “Quota Database,” available at 
http://www.quotaproject.org/displayCountry.cfm?CountryCode=BR (last visited July 16, 2006).  
Since the quota law raised this maximum from 100 to 150% of total fillable seats per constituency, 
this provision has tended to minimize the overall effect of the quota law.  Id.
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cultural dependence makes it the more fundamental category,205 necessarily 
involving the power differential in that relationship.  The condition of being male 
or female is a condition in which varies from culture to culture.  Yet, it is 
undeniable that the power relationship between men and women varies along 
cultural lines.  Gender implies a power relationship because every culture has 
power dichotomies within it.   
Although gender scholars have long recognized the contingent nature of 
gender identity generally, feminist international scholars have not fully accounted 
for the impact of this contingency on international human rights law.  The reason 
is clear: at first blush, one may view such contingency as an additional “softness” 
added to the already “soft” law concepts in international women’s human rights 
law.  The culturally dependent nature of gender, even if women’s rights advocates 
attempt to simplify it, surfaces despite such efforts.  CEDAW encounters 
challenges in enforcement; it targets discrimination against women around the 
world when different cultures and countries may define such “discrimination” in 
vastly different ways.   
Women’s rights treaties are limited in their ability to achieve real change 
for women on the ground.  With regard to the specific comparison between Brazil 
and France, cultural, socioeconomic, and political differences animate differing 
constructions of gender.  Comparative methods may examine international law as 
it would another national legal system, describing its culture or investigating its 
unspoken presumptions and norms.  This section will deal with the complexities 
of culture and gender in the international context.   
This challenge has confronted states with multiple distinct cultures with 
significant conflict over how to regulate accepted practices of different cultures.   
This subpart will explore the different gender constructions, first pointing toward 
differing political understandings of gender, then pointing toward socioeconomic 
differences. 
 
1. Political Constructions of Gender in Parity and the Quota Law 
 
Twenty percent means the world in discerning differences between Parity 
and the Quota Law.  The Quota Law’s thirty percent requirement206 reflects a 
fundamental distinction between Parity’s fifty percent requirement.207 Brazil 
 
205 Katherine Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of 
Sex from Gender,144 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1995). 
206 Law N° 9100/95 art. 11, ¶ 3; Law N° 9504/97 art. 10, ¶ 3 (collectively referred to as “Quota 
Law”) (hereinafter as Quota Law). 
207 In my article, Parity/Disparity: The Political Representation of Gender on the Tightrope of 
Liberal Constitutional Traditions, forthcoming in U.C. Davis Law Review, I argue that remedies 
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labeled its law a quota, and intended it as such, a remedy for perceived imbalance 
to bring new participants into a recently revived democracy.  Women’s role here 
is one of a minority, rather than half the population.  Such a quota was anathema 
to the French notion of a democratic universalism, similar to the rejection of 
quotas in the United States.208 Brazil’s law, unlike France, did not reflect a 
gendered notion of the polity.   
 Each of these two countries has a democratic tradition that affects the 
nature of the remedy adopted for electoral gender inequality.  Even among 
democratic nations adopting such remedies, differences in democratic structure, 
economic advancement, and gender roles render the uniform application of 
international law impractical.  In addition, it is difficult to ascribe innovation to 
any particular element given the vast divergence in the conceptions of rights.   
These variations in democratic structure each suggest different premises for law at 
the domestic level that may provide models for broader participation at the 
international level. 
 
a.  Brazil – Attending to Women’s Need for Representation 
 
With regard to democratic structure, historical elements in Brazil play a 
large role.   Although Brazil’s democratic institutions may be recent, it has a 180-
year tradition of Legislative and Judiciary power, and their precedents carry great 
weight.  Initially supporting the dictatorship in 1964 under the slogan “the Family, 
with God, for Liberty,” women became part of the core opposition to the 
dictatorship until its defeat in 1985.  For some on the left, the quota for women’s 
representation served as a recognition of role of women in subverting autocracy.   
These elements point to Brazil’s quota as a quota rather than a reconfiguration of 
the entire democratic structure. 
 While Brazilian advocates and subsequent discussions emphasized 
women’s special needs, French discussions centered on the establishment of 
women’s citizenship as separate from that of men, deserving its own 
representation in the political system.  This distinction between needs and 
citizenship signals an important difference – needs reference a duty by the state 
whereas citizenship points toward women’s role in running the state itself.  The 
Brazilian discourse also centered on notions of affirmative action that required a 
discussion of a reason for women’s special needs.  The difference between men 
 
for group inequality, and gender inequality in government in particular, should incorporate the 
principle of fluidity to avoid essentializing subordinate identities.  See, Rosenblum, supra note 
132. 
208 Id., at x. 
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and women centered on natural, rather than cultural issues,209 and the proposal 
dwelled on an idea of women’s needs rather than on women’s abilities.   The 
passage of the law, and in particular the provisions to increase the level of 
participation over the course of time, demonstrates a recognition that equality 
between the sexes does not prevent the passage of sex-specific legislation.  In 
contrast, French constitutional law would have never permitted such affirmative 
action arguments to serve as the basis for a law. 
 
b. France – Representing the Gendered Universal 
 
France, in contrast, adopted Parity in the context of a constitutional history 
steeped in radically egalitarian universalism.210 All people should be treated 
equally by the French state.  France’s tradition of universalism in its 
Constitutional theory requires that all citizens be treated entirely equally.  For that 
reason, there is no affirmative action in France, and the recent proposal to ensure 
the continued secular nature of the public schools centers on denying the 
expression of religious diversity.211 Accordingly, early efforts at adopting a quota 
for women’s representation faced rejection by the Constitutional Court as 
violating this universalism. 
 French Parity advocates responded to this universalism by reframing the 
quota as Parity, in which women were half of the citizenry, participating in a 
gendered universalism as equals to men.   Parity, advocates succeeded in arguing, 
was not a quota, but a vision of the French state as reflective of a gendered polity.  
Advocates argued that women had a right to equal participation: "[o]n the social 
level as on the legal level, it is for women to demand to occupy not second place 
in the scope of humanity, but the first, in equality with men."212 Prior to Parity’s 
adoption, with women’s representation levels below ten percent in many 
jurisdictions, Parity advocates claimed that women were being subjected to the 
rule of men.213 "The monopolization of power by a group, by a clique, as well as 
by a sex is a usurpation."214 
209 Incidentally, when Marta Suplicy was elected to Parliament in 1994, her first proposal was to 
ensure that women deputies could have offices with bathrooms (not all did), arguing that women 
need more privacy going to the toilet than men. 
210 See, Rosenblum, supra note 132.  
211 See, e.g., Laïcité : la décision de M. Chirac suscite des critiques à l'étranger, Le Monde, Dec. 
22, 2003.  
212 Françoise Gaspard, Au Pouvoir Citoyennes!, 124.  
213 Such assertions ignored the fact that many of the voters who had elected these men were 
themselves women. Women's advocates thus conflated representation with descriptive 
representation, presuming, at least to some extent, that only women can represent women. 
214 Gaspard, supra note 32, at 181. 
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France’s Parity advocates adeptly capitalized on French notions of 
women’s identity to achieve their goals in the face of a strictly anti-group rights 
constitutional structure.  Likewise, Brazil’s adoption of the Lei das Cotas 
demonstrates a willingness to engage in democratic experimentation precisely 
because its democratic institutions are so recent, and the constitutional provisions 
related to the Quota Law are still open to fresh interpretation.  The advantage of 
such a recent democratic structure is that it permits more contextual responses to 
policy problems without incurring the objections of strict interpretationalists of 
the Constitution. 
 
3. Socioeconomic Construction of Gender 
Although gender differs on many axes and may be a difference that defies 
easy definition, it is a difference that exists nonetheless.  Distinct socio-legal 
constructions of gender form the basis for the two laws: Brazil’s construction of 
gender underlies and informs the Quota Law as France’s construction of gender 
created Parity.   
 Socioeconomic constructions form the relationship between gender and 
the public/private dichotomy.  France’s advanced social services permit women to 
reduce their private responsibilities.  In Brazil, family structures generally consign 
women to managing the home.  Without access to abortion, that home includes 
more children.  Limited daycare, public education, and healthcare increase 
women’s “private” role, leaving Brazilian women with far more family 
responsibilities.  In contrast, French women benefit from extensive social services 
and a higher workforce penetration.  The nature of gender itself differs based on 
these socioeconomic factors that construct power differentials between men and 
women.  Gender differs between France and Brazil and the male/female power 
relationship also differs.  These “private” roles affect the potential to assume 
“public” responsibilities.   
 In France, despite women’s social advancement, the political culture’s 
centralization maintains a male culture in which much of the leadership attended 
the same set of schools and even speak a similar language.  Women with civil 
society experience cannot easily compete in the political field against such 
insiders.  
 
3. The Politics of Gender 
 
The political debates over these two laws reveal differences in gender 
construction.  On its face, Brazil’s Quota Law strikes an impressive note of 
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the Campanha Mulheres sem Medo de Poder in 1996.    However, elements of the 
law and its commentary expose a less sanguine view of women’s strength.  
Discussion of the Quota Law’s lack of dramatic success has focused not on 
sexism within the male political establishment but on women themselves, and in 
particular their conflicted roles between politics and family.  One commentator 
stated that women were less likely to run for and serve in an elected position in 
the federal government because to do so would require moving to Brasilia, 
leaving their families at least part of the time.215 If it were the case that women 
obtained significantly more positions in local elections this argument might 
explain the disparity, but they do not.216 Brazilian women’s larger family 
responsibilities limit their ability to work in far-off Brasilia, distant from the 
population centers in the Southeast coast.  This issue does not arise in France, 
where a far larger percentage of the population lives near the political center of 
the country. 
Other press commentary, notably a brief article in O Globo entitled 
“Parties are Male Ghettos,” confirms this widespread perception of a conflict 
between public life and family life.217 Few women get any support from the 
political party, and less support from their husbands, whose only concern often 
appears to be “até pelo horário em que ela chega?” (when will she get home?)218 
The economic and legal structures in Brazilian lives put women in a position with 
such substantial “private” responsibilities that they cannot effectively function in 
a “public” role when their family role is viewed as paramount. 
Other arguments in favor of this quota relied on what would be considered 
stereotypically "essentialist" thinking, such as statements that men do not engage 
directly in giving birth, which "imposes on women a prolonged period of rest,"219 
the implication being that childbirth inhibits running for political office.  The 
percentage of a woman’s life spent on childbirth is minimal, yet this argument 
carried substantial weight in tradition-bound Brazil.  Once this debate had been 
resolved, the issue over what percentage to apportion to women candidates was 
not considered as crucial, although full parity was not deemed an option. 
The Brazilian construction of women as a minority – a minority with 
needs, a minority that has suffered discrimination, flows from the vast gender 
inequities in Brazil, both socio-economic and political.  The Quota Law’s 
 
215 Malhieros Miguel, supra note 1, at 174.   
216 In the United States, in contrast, women do have higher participation at the state level, perhaps 
reflecting the less financially demanding nature of such races.  Roderick Hills, Fordham Law 
School, March 25, 2006.  
217 Partidos São Guetos Masculinos, O Globo, Oct. 6, 2002.   
218 Marta Suplicy, Coisa Pequena Folha de São Paulo, Sept. 30, 1996 (quoted in Malheiros 
Miguel, supra note 1, at 175). 
219 Id. (quoting Senator Lucio Alcantara). 
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inefficacy draws on the relative powerlessness of the target beneficiary.  The 
strength of the public/private dichotomy undergirds this discrepancy.   Women’s 
relegation to and responsibility for the “private” economy is conveyed in the 
comment by the husband of the Brazilian woman politician that he only cares 
when she will be home.  Until women can share the “private” responsibilities of 
family with the state, as in France, or with men, their inclusion in the political 
system will continue to be minor.  Yet, for all the Quota Law’s inefficacy, it is not 
a sad story of a purely symbolic remedy for inequality.  The Quota Law 
demonstrates the power of international gender norms that the law became part of 
the country’s nascent legal landscape despite such a strong public/private 
dichotomy.    
In France, Parity’s gendered universalism reflects substantially different 
understandings of the relationship between gender and democracy.  The notion of 
gender as dual, of society as composed by men and women, formed the basis for 
Parity.  This insistence on equality, perhaps to a fault,220 figures prominently in 
the more effective impact of Parity.  
As gender’s cultural contingency suggests CEDAW’s limitations, the wide 
variation between these two democracies in gender roles reveals the challenges 
facing international policy.  The process of internalization will necessarily vary 
from country to country when each involves widely diverging cultural constructs 
that directly affect this internalization.  International law theory that overlooks 
such cultural realities cannot hope to overcome such challenges. 
 
4. CEDAW’s Cultural Contingency 
 
Like many other ostensibly universal international instruments, CEDAW 
faces a particularly challenging barrier in the translation of a universal conception 
into different nations’ sharply conflicting legal cultures.  Differentiation among 
legal cultures may lead to divergent internalizations of the same international law.  
Even among democratic nations adopting remedies for electoral gender 
inequality, differences in democratic structure, economic advancement, and 
gender roles render the uniform application of international law impractical.  At 
the international level, this cultural distinction renders the elaboration of 
international women's human rights law especially challenging.   
CEDAW’s softness reflects the underlying inability of states to agree to 
specific enforceable remedies for gender inequality.  The plethora of reservations 
attached to states that have agreed to the Convention evidences this lack of 
agreement.  Brazil and France show the wide range of gender constructions, 
 
220 The fault here worth noting is the challenge of incorporating gender diversity in such a dualistic 
system.  It is not clear how transgender candidates would figure in the Parity system.  
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including differing roles and the viability of vastly different understandings of the 
universal.  Awareness of difference creates possibilities for new and different 
universals, formulated based on broader understanding of cultural realities rather 
than simple projections of one’s own culture onto the map of the world political 
stage.  Yet, the problem facing internalization of international gender rights runs 
far deeper than the homogenized cultural relativism behind vague international 
language.   
Comparative techniques elucidate the potential for integrating comparative 
and international scholarship.  One of the contributions comparativists bring to 
international law is to examine its construction and culture, and necessarily, its 
biases.221 Here, the political goals of CEDAW presume sociopolitical structures 
of firmly rooted democracies.  The terminology of “sex” and “gender” ignores the 
potential for variation of gender definitions by culture – in certain countries, 
gender means the divide between men and women, in others it may mean the 
fluidity of such identities, or even the ability to choose sex or marital partners 
without regard to gender.  Comparative work reveals such cultural variations and 
their legal import.  
CEDAW’s political goals presume sociopolitical structures of firmly 
rooted democracies.  The terminology of “sex” and “gender” ignores the potential 
for variation of gender definitions by culture – in certain countries, gender means 
the divide between men and women, in others it may mean the fluidity of such 
identities, or even the ability to choose sex or marital partners without regard to 
gender.  Comparative work reveals such cultural variations and their legal import.  
Although Charlesworth and Chinkin have addressed the antiessentialist arguments 
that surface with regard to international women’s rights law, they did not address 
the cultural contingency of gender definitions.   
A quick glance at some of the widely divergent gender identities reveals 
the extent to which universal norms ignore gender’s cultural construction.  Thai 
and Indian gender identities, as Sonia Katyal has demonstrated, incorporate both 
sharply divergent gender and sexual identities.222 Larry Catá Backer has 
 
221 See, e.g., Annelise Riles, supra note 224. 
222 See Sonia Katyal, Exporting Identity, 14 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 97 (2002). In recent years, gay 
social movements emerged across the globe. Id., at 137. These movements drew on a western 
model based on the relationship between sexual identity and sexual conduct. Id. The globalization 
of the western model collided with pre-existing transgendered meaning of homosexuality and has 
significantly contributed to the alienation and disenfranchisement of Thailand's kathoeys - 
commonly called a 'third sex' within both popular and academic discourses. Id. at 136-38. India 
opted for the term MSM, or men who have sex with men. Id. at 153. MSM refers "to men from all 
age groups, marital status, economic classes, educational backgrounds, caste and religious 
communities, sexual identities, and gender identities who engage in sexual activity with other 
men." Id. India's reluctance to adopt the western model is because in India, for the majority of men 
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contrasted constructions of gender and sexuality in Malaysia, Zimbabwe, and the 
United States.223 Underlying these cultural explorations, Frank Valdes has 
explored how identities of sex, gender, and sexuality interact in a dynamic 
relationship.   
This dynamic relationship necessarily varies across cultures.  The 
existence of so many culturally different constructions of gender reveals the 
limitation of CEDAW’s emphasis on the category “women.”224 Given the 
interaction of these categories, an international convention on “women” should 
also be a convention on gender, and for that matter, on sexuality.  Moving the 
world from hundreds of different gender systems to a universal one, in the name 
of fair treatment of women seems at once boldly idealistic and fraught with 
incessant pitfalls as difference rears its complicated head. 
 
IV. Comparative Realities, International Consequences  
The variability of gender across national lines shapes the internalization of 
international human rights law.  Remedies for group inequality necessarily 
depend on the construction of the identity concerned.  But the internalization of 
international women’s rights norms by Brazil and France reveals more than the 
culturally-dependent nature of gender; it suggests ways in which international law 
 
who have sex with men, personal identity is not seen as the main issue. Id. at 154. This results in a 
range of sexualities, homosexualities and homosexual behaviors and, identities that is very 
different of that of the western societies. Id. at 154-55. India and Thailand clearly demonstrate that 
the substitutive model of the western world may be inadequate for obtaining protection for the vast 
numbers of sexual minorities throughout the world. Id. at 102. 
223 Larry Cata Backer, Emansculated Men, Effeminate Law in the United States, Zimbabwe and 
Malaysia, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2005). In Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, Zimbabwe's leader, 
used politics to harness the gender panic to further his own political ambitions and was able to 
represent homosexuality as an evil originating from outside Africa and a corruption should it 
occur within Zimbabwe. Id at 35-36. In Malaysia, however, "religion provides the primary socio-
cultural setting within which gender meaning operates." Id. at 22. For example, in 1998, the then 
residing Malaysia's Prime Minister, Mahathir bin Mohammad, ordered the arrest of his adversary, 
Anwar Ibrahim, accusing him of corruption and sodomy. Id. at 17-18. Mahathir successfully 
conflated religion and sexual corruption to alarm and put the Malaysian people in panic. Id. at 18-
19. In both the Zimbabwean and Malaysian cases, there emerges a consistent drive within each 
society to create and force hierarchies of sex based on meanings ascribed to gender. Id. at 5. In 
each case, "society extracts a price from men who fail to conform to gender role ideals, and that 
non-conformity is used both to clarify the characteristics of the ideal 'male' and to distinguish that 
ideal from lesser 'other.'" Id. 
224 A future piece will address the potential for international gender norms if CEDAW were 
retooled to address gender inequality rather than discrimination against women. A gender-based 
reconsideration of all political systems would certainly raise differences in governmental structure 
as well as the role gender plays in dividing political power.  
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can and does account for national differences.  Incorporating comparative  
perspectives involving difference may lead to the elaboration of laws that 
encourage internalization.   
 This Part will assess the consequence of the example of quotas for 
women’s representation in Brazil and France for international law.  First, it will 
explore comparative contributions to international law directly and indirectly 
suggested by this example, including the utility of “soft” law and prospective new 
universals.  Second, it will revisit the internalization theories that began Part II.   
The Brazil/France example provides compelling ways to consider the accuracy of 
prevailing rational-actor theoretical models.  The internalization by Brazil and 
France of CEDAW’s Article Seven reveals limitations to these theories. 
 
A. Comparative Contributions to International Law 
 
Comparative methodologies and knowledge can enrich international legal 
theory, as discussed in Part II.  Comparative methods provide three potential 
perspectives on international law: studying international law as another state legal 
system; implementation-oriented considerations to improve internalization and to 
challenge and refine international law’s normative goals.  Transnational projects 
must integrate national considerations.  Accounting for such differences, rather 
than erasing them, can encourage effective internalization: different gender 
constructions lead to appropriately different remedies for gender inequality.  
CEDAW’s norms should incorporate those cultural realities.  This subpart will 
suggest potential lessons to draw from this comparative work for the 
understanding of internalization.  First, additional context from the Brazil/France 
example points toward the complex relationship between “soft” law and “hard” 
law in the internalization of international norms.  Second, France’s 
reconfiguration of the universal incorporating gender demonstrates the potential 
for new universals that may foster the internalization of international law. 
 
1. Internalizing Softness? 
 
CEDAW is a “soft” international instrument.  When states comply with 
international law and internalize those norms, this internalization may mirror not 
just the substance of the law, but its form as well.225 One of the consequences of 
 
225 The dichotomy between form and substance can and often is a false one, as French 
structuralists such as Saussure demonstrated, but it can provide useful terminology to address 
methods.  See,e.g., Kal Raustiala, supra note x.   
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international law's softness on gender is the way in some countries internalize 
international law on gender.  With regard to international women’s human rights, 
a state may agree with the goals of the convention, but also adopt the weak 
mechanisms of enforcement.   States that wish to be seen as supporting the lofty 
aspirations of drafters of key soft-law documents, notably human rights treaties, 
may enact laws containing few or no substantive remedies.  “Soft” international 
law responses to gender inequality may lead to “soft” domestic laws.   
The Quota Law’s lack of substantial enforcement mechanisms suggests 
that states may copy and internalize this softness. International soft law may lead 
states to adopt domestic soft law that only delivers spoken commitments rather 
than enacted transformations.  Perhaps states with extensively under-enforced 
legal systems, whether due to bureaucratic resistance, budgetary, or other 
limitations may be more likely to internalize softness.226 Thus, Brazil, whose 
legal implementation is not as consistent as France, would be more likely to face 
this problem of internalized softness.  This may, in part, explain the better (but not 
ideal) results in France as compared to Brazil.227 
A lack of serious enforcement leads to differential results, as political 
parties see no incentive to reject known male candidates in favor of unknown 
female candidates.228 The very structure of the Quota Law provides for a lack of 
efficacy, as women candidates do not displace men candidates, allowing the 
parties to avoid the difficult decision of which men not to nominate so that 
women candidates can run for office.  Thus, in Brazil, not only do the political 
parties fail to meet the required level of candidacies, but women candidates also 
have less opportunity to succeed. 
Whereas Brazil’s enactment of the Quota Law did not entail concrete 
enforcement mechanisms, France arrived at a “harder” level of domestic 
enforcement of these provisions.  The context exposed by comparative knowledge 
may explain the different potential outcomes in different domestic contexts. As 
addressed in Part Two, international scholars emphasizing institutional 
compliance recognize the myriad roles played by different governmental 
institutions in different countries.  In remedying women’s underrepresentation, 
France involved several institutions in amending its Constitution, passing the 
Parity legislation, including the establishment of the Observatoire de Parité.    
The “softness” may be intentional – proponents of legislation may not 
intend for enforcement to occur.  At the international level, Hathaway has pointed 
 
226 Cite to Brazilian Judicial Reform Act of 2006.  
227 Id. 
228 Guillame Frechette, Francois Maniquet and Massimo Morelli, Endogenous Affirmative Action: 
Gender Bias Leads to Gender Quotas, available at 
http://homepages.nyu.edu/~gf35/print/fmm.pdf.
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out that that a country’s accession to a human rights convention does not evince 
compliance with human rights norms.229 Nations may sign conventions with no 
intent to comply.   
With the multiplicity of motivations behind national compliance with 
international law, it is possible that two nations could comply for entirely 
different reasons – with the intent to comply or the intent not to comply.230 Thus, 
at the domestic level, proponents of progressive legislation may not intend the 
goals of their legislation to occur.  Legislators support provisions that deliberately 
fail to achieve their goal, protecting male legislators and future candidates from 
competition by women.   
However, a “soft” enforcement mechanism may not be the only way to comply 
without substantive change.  One study of the Parity law asserts that male 
legislators supported the law to protect their incumbency, knowing that women 
candidates would attract fewer votes.231 Thus, male legislators passed what may 
be called a semi-hard enforcement mechanism to ensure their own survival.  
Progressive legislation on women’s political representation may ultimately fail to 
achieve its ostensible goal.  Although it would be difficult to establish a causal 
relationship, international soft law may inspire ineffective internalization of those 
international norms.  The potential for soft law to encourage internalization of soft 
law first raises the more technical question of how international law may be 
structured to avoid encouraging soft remedies on the domestic level.  Soft human 
rights law may entail previously unanticipated costs, encouraging effective 
remedies in some countries and ineffective ones in others.232 
2. New Universals for International Law 
 
Comparative law may help question and refine goals of international law.   
France’s framing Parity as a new understanding of the universal suggests 
alternative ways to conceive collective values.  Legal cultural differences raise 
possibilities for new understandings of universal values.   
The French model of gendered universalism provides a radically different 
model.  The Brazilian consideration of women as a minority reflect substantially 
 
229 See, Hathaway, supra note 88, at x. 
230 See Peter M. Haas, Why Comply, or Some Hypotheses in Search of an Analyst, in 
INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE WITH NONBINDING ACCORDS 21-48 (Edith Brown Weiss ed., 1997). 
231 See, Frechette, et. al., supra note 224.  
232 This argument may have unwelcome consequences.  Generally, states intentionally choose soft 
law over a binding hard law instruments when they are uncertain as to the effects of the treaty or 
when they are intent on achieving a goal but not yet ready to accede to a binding treaty. Chinkin, 
supra note 26, at 857. As some theorists have argued, smaller groups of nations may adopt more 
aggressive agreements regarding these international legal issues. 
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different understandings of the relationship between gender and democracy.  The 
French construction of a gendered universal invites deliberation over other ways 
to conceptualize universals.  Comparative methodologies may unearth such new 
universals for incorporation into international law.  Comparative methodologies 
expose such new potentialities, providing scholars in both international and 
comparative fields with sources of research and deliberation.  The burgeoning 
area of comparative constitutional law raises many new possibilities for 
international law to address universally-applicable laws that nonetheless account 
for differences among and within nations and cultures.  
France’s adoption of Parity reflected the agreement that the universal was 
gendered.  France’s democracy has served as one of the inspirations of 
international human rights.  The “Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
the Citizen,” first heard as a speech given early in the Revolution,233 would 
become the basis for future democratic efforts, most notably the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights in the United Nations Charter.234 Under universalist 
doctrine, all should be treated equally, without regard to membership in any 
particular group.235 This universalism sits at the heart of French democracy, 
which considers the elimination of cultural difference is “the best defense against 
intercommunity tensions, violence, political and cultural fragmentation and the 
destruction of democracy.”236 
Parity originally aroused critiques that it violated France’s universalist 
doctrine. In response, feminists had to convince the French that Parity would not 
violate this Universalism.  They argued in favor of an understanding of “the 
duality of the human instead of the difference of the sexes.”237 This effort 
succeeded in transforming French constitutional culture, a sea change in French 
political thought regarding the issue of sexual difference.  In linking women’s 
representation to the functioning of French democracy itself, feminists provided a 
 
233 Sieyès, Reconnaissance et exposition raisonnée des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen, (July 20-
21), 1789, referenced in GASPARD ET AL., supra note 81, at 51.  
234 HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, CELEBRATING THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS, http://www.hrc.co.nz/index.php?p=451&format=text#2 (last visited Jan. 27, 2006) (“In 
1789 the French Revolution produced the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen.  
Article II declares that ‘The aim of all political association is the conservation of the natural and 
inalienable rights of man.  These rights are:  liberty, property, security and resistance to oppression 
. . . .’  It was the humanitarian premise in this Declaration that was to inspire and inform the 
development of the ideology surrounding the UDHR and modern ideas of human rights.”) 
235 GASPARD, supra note 81, at 20-40. 
236ALLWOOD & WADIA, supra note 89, at 215-22.  “Parity, it is claimed, would distinguish 
between categories of citizens, and this is contrary to the principle of universalism, according to 
which all citizens are equal and, in political terms, the same.  Parity would thus destroy one of the 
very bases of democracy.” Id. 
237 Scott, supra note 23, at 42.  
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point of departure for attempting democratic innovation.  Parity advocates argued 
that women should not receive special rights as a group, but rather as half of the 
citizenry.  This reimagined French universal reflects a different conceptualization 
of the relationship between gender and democracy, one that could serve as a 
different basis for the relationship between international law and states. 
Such comparative contributions to international human rights norms also 
provoke a reconsideration of internalization theory and skeptics of internalization 
theory. 
B. Shortcomings of Skeptical International Theory  
 
This subpart will revisit international law skeptics whose work had been 
addressed in Part Two.  The Brazil/France internalization example reveals critical 
weaknesses in these theories.  Hathaway, Goldsmith and Posner ignore the 
prominent role culture plays in the internalization of human rights norms.  While 
culture plays a large role in internalization processes, this does not support the 
idea that compliance is a coincidence.  The Brazil/France example also points to 
the key role played by nongovernmental organizations and actors in the 
internalization of international law.  This Part concludes that the weaknesses of 
rational actor theory reveal advantages of acculturation theory, which can be read 
as taking national differences into account.   
 
1.  Challenges to Hathaway 
Hathaway argued that a country’s signature on a human rights document 
does not indicate observance of such commitments.  The internalization by Brazil 
and France of CEDAW’s norms provides both a methodological and a substantive  
counter-example.  Methodologically, the breadth of Hathaway’s empirical study 
overlooks the cultural differences that may define compliance or noncompliance.  
The ingenuity of her counterintuitive point aside, such sweeping analysis may 
actually obscure realities in many contexts.  As addressed in the previous subpart, 
various motivations may underlay compliance, as with the Parity example in 
which some assert that the legislators supporting Parity actually did so to preserve 
male incumbent positions.   
Substantively, the CEDAW compliance of both Brazil and France show 
that signing a human rights treaty may signal actual compliance.  This challenge 
is of a more limited nature than the methodological point, as it only addresses the 
evidence from two countries.  Nonetheless, Brazil and France counter Hathaway’s 
assertion that signatories to human rights treaties actually may reject such norms.   
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Eric Posner and Jack Goldsmith emphasize the impact of rational-actor 
theory on international law, arguing that some combination of the four models of 
state relations (coincidence of interest, coordination, cooperation, and coercion) 
can explain state behavior, rather than compliance.238 They argue that 
coincidence, rather than law, has led to improving treatment for various groups in 
liberal democracies.  As a general rule, governments have a weaker interest in the 
well-being of persons in other states,239 and governments have little interest in 
violating their citizens’ rights.240 They presume the universality of individual 
rights norms, even though many states function, even thrive, on ignoring these 
rights. Goldsmith and Posner make a related assertion regarding specific groups 
that have been the subject of international conventions.   “The rise of women’s 
and children’s rights in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was a phenomenon 
unrelated to international law; so was the decline of racial and religious 
discrimination.”241 Again, they assert that coincidence, not international law, 
explains compliance.242 
238 Id. at 11-13.  The first model, coincidence of interest, occurs “when a pattern of 
behavior…results from each state acting in its own self-interest without any regard to the action of 
the other state.” Id. at 12. The second, coordination, occurs when states clarify some point so that 
they can “plan accordingly and avoid conflict.”  Id. Cooperation is the third model, and occurs 
when each state agrees, either explicitly or implicitly, on a solution “that reflects their interests and 
capacities.”  States will then “reciprocally refrain from activities…that would otherwise be in their 
immediate self-interest in order to reap larger medium- or long-term benefits.”  Id. Finally, the 
fourth model is coercion.  This results “when a powerful state (or coalition of states with 
convergent interests) forces weaker states to engage in acts that are contrary to their interests.”  Id.
239 The Goldsmith and Posner claim falls short of the more radical claim, made by Hathaway, that 
rational states should not take an interest in how other states treat their citizens. Hathaway, supra 
note 88, 1823, cited in Goldsmith and Posner, supra note 7, at 109.  Posner and Goldsmith point 
out that some individuals care about individuals in other states that share some identity; or when a 
particular civil rights question draws their interest; or when one country ascribes to the opinion 
that liberal democracies do not go to war with other liberal democracies.   Id., at 109-10. 
240 Goldsmith and Posner presume a general propensity to respect human rights, independent of 
international law:  “[b]oth before and after the twentieth-century development of international law 
prohibitions on these crimes, states have had many good reasons, independent of human rights 
law, for refraining from committing these crimes against local populations.”  Simply put, they 
argue that usually states have no interest in regular violations of human rights, ignoring incentives 
to abuse power and disincentives to respect individual rights. Goldsmith and Posner, supra note 7, 
at 111. 
241 Id. 
242 Goldsmith and Posner also argue that some human rights development draws on liberal states 
pressuring other states.  They assert that where liberal countries exert pressure on human rights 
issues, they do so without regard to the signature of the offending country to a human rights treaty.  
Id. This assertion echoes Hathaway’s point that compliance with human rights norms does not 
depend on a country’s signature to human rights treaties.  Hathaway, supra note 88.   Yet the 
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The Brazil/France internalization undermines their argument: first, the 
state is not the only relevant actor in international human rights enforcement;  
second, compliance is no coincidence.   
One may presume that the comparative emphasis on cultural difference 
would point toward the importance of relativist factors, rather than international 
law.  As discussed earlier, internationalists, such as Koh, may fear cultural 
relativism as challenging the viability of their universal norms.   
The Brazil/France example points to an internalization that re-interprets 
international norms, colored with local cultural realities.  As discussed above, 
internalizing international gender norms into France or into Brazil necessarily will 
adapt to domestic gender constructions.  Against the arguments of Koh for the 
internalization of a unitary set of norms, Goldsmith and Posner may point to this 
relativism as another reason supporting their assertion that coincidence defines 
compliance, and that states may use difference to excuse noncompliance.243 
Such an assertion would not be accurate – the importance of culture and 
local factors does not demonstrate the irrelevance of international norms.  
Internalization still occurs, though – in contrast with Koh, it is mediated by 
domestic values.  In contrast with Goldsmith and Posner is the fact that the 
internalization still draws on international norms.  In implementation, 
international norms becomes fragmented and, to some extent, de-universalized.  
This process reveals a reciprocal relationship between international norms and 
domestic constructs, one of borrowed and interactive values.  The syncretic nature 
of internalization nonetheless builds on the influence of international norms.  
Thus, the Brazil/France example may point to an internalization process less 
directly robust than that described by Koh, but stronger than that asserted by 
Goldsmith and Posner.  Internalization occurs, but it will be mediated by domestic 
constructs and values.   
 
3. Internalizing Gender: Beyond the State 
 
The state is not the only player in internalization, as the Brazil/France 
example reveals.  Goldsmith and Posner assert that “international law addresses 
itself to states and for the most part, not to individuals or other entities such as 
 
presumption that change results from one state pressuring another resumption that some states will 
pressure others does not apply in the area of women’s rights, where few states count any 
substantial representation of women in government. 
243 Obiora, supra note 183, at 678.  Leti Volpp’s fascinating work on considering cultural 
difference provides considerable support for deeper thinking about these issues.  See, e.g., Leti 
Volpp, On Culture, Difference, and Domestic Violence, 11 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 393 
(2003). 
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governments.”244 Although in a different vein, Hathaway’s study also emphasizes 
the role of the state.  In centering on the modern state, these scholars overlook the 
crucial role that non-state actors play in internalization.  Not only do individuals 
serve as subjects for international law protection, but nongovernmental 
organizations and activist networks actually generate the internalization of 
international norms.245 Scholars across disciplines recognize the importance of 
non-state actors in the public sphere.246 
The key counter-argument to Goldsmith and Posner is the role of non-state 
actors, such as nongovernmental organizations, working in tandem with 
international legal structures to foster deeper compliance with, and even 
internalization of, international law.    
As Keck and Sikkink have argued, transnational advocacy networks bring 
together relevant actors on a variety of issues.  These networks of activists 
“mobilize information strategically to help create new issues and categories and to 
persuade, pressure and gain leverage over much more powerful organizations and 
governments.”247 In so doing, they “promote norm implementation, by pressuring 
target actors to adopt new policies, and by monitoring compliance with 
international standards."248 These transnational advocacy networks usually work 
on issues of bodily harm to vulnerable individuals or promoting legal equality,249 
both directly and indirectly.250 
The Brazil/France example confirms the Keck and Sikkink findings.  As 
discussed earlier, Brazilian and French laws to promote women’s political 
equality drew on networks developed at the Fourth World Conference on Women, 
held in Beijing in 1995.251 This Conference and the role it played in inspiring 
efforts to give life to CEDAW Article Seven, points to the import of Keck and 
Sikkink’s study to the quota movement – demonstrating the crucial nature of 
activist networks as dispersed but still effective enforcers of international 
 
244 Goldsmith and Posner to recognize that the state has some limitations, but that it is still the 
salient entity for international law. Goldsmith and Posner, supra, note 7, at 4. 
245 Although Goldsmith and Posner focus on the state, several of their examples emphasize the 
important role of non-governmental organizations in the movements opposing both the treatment 
of Africans by the Belgians in their conquest of the Congo and with regard to the slave trade. Id. at 
110. 
246 See, e.g., M.J. Peterson, Transnational Activity, International Society, and World Politics, 21:3 
MILLENIUM 389-420 (1992), cited in Keck and Sikkink, supra note x, at 32, n.63. 
247 MARGARET E. KECK AND KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS 2 (1998). 
248 Keck and Sikkink, supra note x, at 3. 
249 Id. at 27.   
250 The  
251 The United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women Platform for Action, available at 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/platform/decision.htm (last visited July 24, 2006). 
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norms.252 The connection between international law and national activists 
requires reconsideration of the theoretical understandings of internalisation. 
 
4. Acculturation: Internalizing International Norms 
 
The role that nongovernmental activists play in bringing international 
norms into domestic contexts points to the utility of one theory of internalization 
in understanding how international gender norms relate to domestic contexts: 
acculturation. 
Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks draw on the meaning of the term 
“acculturation,”253 the process through which groups adopt the behaviors and 
beliefs of a surrounding culture.254 This process, they argue, can be “harnessed” 
by institutions in order to “socialize recalcitrant states” into complying with 
international norms,255 especially in the area of human rights, such as welfare, 
labor policy, and education.256 The authors also use the example of women’s 
rights to demonstrate the convergence of state policy worldwide: they argue that 
“once universal suffrage became a legitimating principle associated with the 
modern nation-state, state enactment of women’s suffrage followed a pattern 
anticipated by theories of acculturation.”257 
252 Indeed, one potential remedy for monitoring human rights is to require violating countries to 
empower gender rights activists to perform studies within the country and conduct meetings and 
make suggestions and draft proposals within the country.  To promote change within the country, 
it may be more culturally realistic to emphasize local activists’ power, perhaps leading 
international law closer to ultimately achieving the same goals more effectively.  To measure 
performance on an international scale, international experts have drafted books to mainstream 
gender. CHRISTINE CHINKIN, GENDER MAINSTREAMING IN LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS:
A REFERENCE MANUAL FOR GOVERNMENTS AND OTHER STAKEHOLDERS (2001).  In such a metric, 
clear standards must delineate state performance.  The power of local activists to foster greater 
change might be an effective method to foster change rather than simply force countries to report 
back to the Commission on the Status of Women.   
253 Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International 
Human Rights Law,54 DUKE L.J. 621 (Dec. 2004). 
254 Id. at 638. 
255 Id. at 638-39. 
256 Id. at 648-50.  Women’s rights, for example, can be used to demonstrate the convergence of 
state policy worldwide: “once universal suffrage became a legitimating principle associated with 
the modern nation-state, state enactment of women’s suffrage followed a pattern anticipated by 
theories of acculturation.” Id. at 650-51. 
257 Id. at 650.  The discussion of other areas of women’s rights (another paragraph or so) carries 
over to 651. 
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Environmental protection and public education demonstrate this 
hypothesis.258 In both areas, states develop similar programs, admitting the state’s 
responsibility to protect the environment or educate.259 Individual states conform 
to general standards to acquire international respect, a kind of social 
internalization.260 This theory draws on Harold Koh’s respect for the holistic 
nature of transformation that must occur across all levels: political, legal, and 
social.261 Koh argues that while there is a place for legislative, executive, and 
judicial implementation by a state, societal internalization, especially at the global 
level, is very important as well.  Goodman and Jinks counter Goldsmith and 
Posner, asserting that the widespread respect for human rights results from states’ 
desire for membership in global society, and not from mere self-interest.   
Acculturation theory reflects the transformative role that may be played by 
internal gender norms that shift in response to economic and political forces.  
These fluid constructions internalize international norms into syncretized 
domestic norms.  This fluidity draws in part on contemporary media phenomena – 
the internet and television – that bring new knowledge and understandings that 
can transform domestic constructions of legal interpretation.262 Even commercial 
globalization contributes to this phenomenon, as multinational corporations seek 
labor for production and markets for sale of their products.  Although profit 
motivates them, these economic changes can undermine the maintenance of 
domestic cultures,263 cultures that sometimes may stand in the way of the 
internalization of international norms.  
 
258 Many states have similar organizational features (what they term “isomorphism”) to implement 
environmental goals and join interstate or intergovernmental environmental organizations. These 
developments at the state level occurred in response to the development of “national 
environmental protection” in the global society as a legitimate goal. Id. at 1762-63. 
259 Public education is a similar case study: to demonstrate their place in the global society, states 
develop isomorphic curricula and have “embraced” the belief or value of the society that the 
primary purpose of the state should be to educate. Id. at 1763-64. 
260 It is worth noting, as the authors do, that these states often implement programs similar to the 
rest of the world even when that particular program may not be the best solution for their 
particular problems.Id. at 1764. 
261 Underlying this acculturation is a vision of states as organizational entities in a broader social 
environment, seeking to pursue “certain globally legitimized goals.” Ryan Goodman and Derek 
Jinks, Toward an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty 55 STAN. L. REV. 1749, 1752, 1762 (May 
2003). 
262 Goldsmith and Posner admit the power of media and trade as transforming global society 
toward greater respect for human rights, but they view these changes as independent of 
international law.  See, Goldsmith and Posner, supra note x, at 121. 
263 See, e.g., AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE (2002), in which she argues that globalization causes 
disruptions that lead to ethnic strife, among other social ills. 
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Another international theory to explain the relationship between national 
governments and international law is the concept of “selective adaptation.”   
Selective adaptation is “made possible by ways in which governments, elites, and 
other interpretive communities express their own normative preferences in the 
course of interpretation and application of practice rules.”264 Selective adaptation 
is a way to balance local needs with the need to comply with rules imposed 
externally by interpreting the external rules in terms of the local norms.265 
Selective adaptation depends in large part on perception, which influences how 
both external and local norms and practices are understood.266 Perceptions 
concerning the purpose, effect, or content of the external and local rules can affect 
the compliance process.267 Local governments’ compliance with international 
gender norms reveals the reality that compliance depends on local officials’ 
interpretation of treaty norms and practices.268 
In sum, the Brazil/France example points to different kinds of 
internalization.  Although rational-actor theories express skepticism over whether 
international law can force change, the involvement of activists points to a deeper 
role for international law.  International law can encourage internalization through 
the multiple levels that accompany acculturation.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
International law faces a world increasingly defined by realism: a realism 
born of naked unilateralism, skeptical of the transformational and transnational 
power of international agreements.  In the past few years, military power has not 
only has diverged from, but has trumped even “hard” international law.269 
In this light, debates over “soft” international law, particularly the “soft” 
law of gender, may appear especially divorced from reality.  Perhaps so.  Perhaps 
this is proven by the fact that even when feminists largely agree, international law 
does not fully reflect this understanding.270 For example, conceptualizing mass 
 
264 See, Potter, supra note x, at 478; see generally STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS:
THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES (1980). 
265 Id.
266 Id. See generally Amitai Etzioni, Social Norms: Internalization, Persuasion, and History, 34 
LAW & SOC. REV. 157 (2000) and ROBERTO UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975).   
267 See, Potter, supra note x, at 478. 
268 Id. 
269 Anne-Marie Slaughter debate in AJIL from 2004. 
270 One possible conclusion to draw from the diversity of gender constructions across the world is 
that a unified international law on gender may need to be of a limited nature.  In the spectrum of 
cultural difference in women’s rights, two issues often surface.   One issue on which women's 
rights activists agree across all countries was the Serbian use of rape as a tool of ethnic 
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rape as a war crime does not make it one, certainly not one that is easily 
punished.271 
Yet at the domestic level, gender law is far from “soft.”  Domestic laws on 
gender vary from state to state: laws that have real impacts on real lives.  One’s 
nationality determines for most whether one can divorce, abort, vote, run for 
political office, inherit property, or claim for discrimination.  Each of these issues, 
and many, many more have straightforward answers enforced by courts or other 
legal authorities in most countries.  Most countries’ laws manifest deep gender 
inequalities.  CEDAW’s norms may inspire fully compliant internalization, 
disdainful evasion, or any point in between.  The iteration of international norms 
in domestic contexts draws on comparative legal understanding. 
As the human population approaches nine billion in the next half-century, 
a world where communities are “neatly hived off from one another seems no 
longer a serious option, if it ever was.”272 As the planet fills with people and as 
the world economy becomes more global, connections among nations and 
cultures shift from exotic luxuries to unavoidable necessities.  Given the dizzying 
increase in internationalization of every sort, comparative and international law 
can no longer be considered “discrete spheres.”273 
Transnationalization “heralds a world public order where no one is outside 
and where indigenous structures and processes invariably interact with alien 
models.”274 States no longer function in complete economic, political, or cultural 
autarky.275 As international law cannot function independently of the states that 
make up the world, comparative law cannot solely address states considered as 
“discrete and insular entities.”276 Bridging these two distanced but related 
disciplines permits both comparative and international law to join the shift toward 
integrating legal knowledge with scholarly endeavors of other disciplines.  The 
goal of transnationalization ultimately benefits from awareness of the crucial 
component – nations – for which comparative law proves essential.   
 
domination.  International women's human rights scholars and practitioners agreed that this 
violated international law.  The issue of female genital cutting provides a marked contrast.  In that 
debate, cultural differences divided the international women's movement, exposing many of the 
fault lines that comparative work might reveal.  
271 Karen Engle (2006). 
272 KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, COSMOPOLITANISM xx (W.W. Norton & Company, Inc. 2006).   
273 Obiora, supra note 183 at 672. 
274 Id.
275 See Morosini, supra note 162, at 542 (asserting that globalization directly affects the domestic 
laws of states). 
276 APPIAH, supra note 219.
Deleted: 25
Deleted: ,
Deleted: 0
Deleted: 47
Deleted: {W:\DOCS\NJPC\0000\jody\
00007041.DOC}
ROSENBLUM – INTERNALIZING GENDER  
60 
One rubric for these cross-boundary and cross-cultural dialogues is 
cosmopolitanism.277 Not a neo-universalist cosmopolitanism, but one that 
embraces diverse legal cultures.  Cosmopolitanism, the inexorable intermingling 
of cultures, reflects new global values of borrowing from other cultures and not 
preserving cultural authenticity.278 Kwame Anthony Appiah’s recent call for a 
revived emphasis on cosmopolitanism finds hope in the bastardization of 
traditionally distinct cultures through contemporary patterns of trade, travel and 
technology.279 The incessant flow among cultures causes an almost constant 
importation and exportation of cultural values.  The complexity of the issues 
raised by comparative methodologies should not intimidate international lawyers, 
but on the contrary, may provide opportunities to better execute their goals or 
even shift their goals to reflect norms that reach underneath and beyond cultural 
difference.280 
Respecting difference may provide countries wiggle room excuse 
noncompliance, a possibility that leads some to fear comparative understandings 
would devolve into relativist nihilism.  Quite to the contrary, the recognition that 
many routes may lead to equality may deepen respect for the underlying 
universality of equality norms. However strong these concerns, deeper 
understanding of national laws and cultures can only strengthen the ability of 
international norms to reach into domestic spheres through internalization. 
This fluidity in norms – the shift from previously sticky conceptions of 
culture to more fluid ones, does not depend solely on a rehashed universal 
humanism, but can draw on deepening understanding of difference.  Increasingly  
fluid cultural norms, and the almost indiscriminate mixing of previously-revered 
cultural constructs challenge structures that have reified both hierarchies of 
gender and gendered hierarchies.  International gender law can and does help 
break open rigid male/female and public/private dichotomies, even if it can do 
this job in vastly more effective ways.281 
277 Id. at xxi. 
278 KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, COSMOPOLITANISM: ETHICS IN A WORLD OF STRANGERS (ISSUES OF 
OUR TIME) (2006).  
279 Id. at 67. 
280 Id. at xiii. 
281 Thus, to use one example from economic development studies – one of the reasons that East 
Asia developed so rapidly in the past fifty years, somersaulting over previously comparable 
economics in the Middle East, is that women can work outside the “private” sphere. See, Nadereh 
Chamlou, World Bank Middle East North Africa Region Report (2004).  If international treaties 
on gender rights had more flexibility, for example, they might account for national differences 
more effectively. A multi-track international treaty could permit the adoption of hard provisions 
for issues that garner widespread agreement, such as rape as a war crime, while permitting softer 
remedies for issues subject to differences, such as female genital cutting.  Such a multi-track 
international treaty could also take place with different countries agreeing to certain provisions.  
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In this effort, international law performs a crucial role.  To succeed, 
international law must reach for ever broader and more comprehensive 
understandings of laws and cultures across the globe, rather than retreating into a 
dialect of the few.  This agenda, in the face of widespread skepticism of late, will 
require, in Danton’s words, “de l’audace, encore de l’audace, toujours de 
l’audace.” 
 
For example, a smaller group of countries could work together on electoral gender inequality, 
while other issues with broader support can gather a broader basket of states working together to 
resolve and harmonize their laws. 
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